Philippine Navy starts procurement of torpedoes and countermeasures for Jose Rizal-class frigates

 
The Philippine Navy (PN) has finally started the acquisition process of torpedoes and countermeasures that will be for use on the service's new Jose Rizal-class frigates that were introduced starting mid 2020.

This has been highly anticipated, considering the first frigate of the class, the lead ship BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) has already entered service with the Philippine Navy since June 2020, while the second ship of the class, the Antonio Luna (FF-151) is on its way for delivery in early 2021.

These acquisition would allow the new frigates to gain offensive capabilities against submarines, and defensive capabilities against torpedoes and missiles.

A torpedo launched from a US Navy destroyer. Photo credits to US Navy.

Frigate Equipment:

The Jose Rizal-class frigates are equipped with two triple trainable 324mm lightweight anti-submarine torpedo tubes from UK's SEA. , as well as two C-Guard DL-6T chaff dispensers from Denmark's Terma A/S.

The SEA triple torpedo tubes (top) and C-Guard countermeasures dispenser (above). Photo credits to original sources.

The torpedo tubes are meant as the offensive weapon of the frigate against submarines, with three ready to fire tubes located on each side of the frigate. Western frigate designs usually use the lightweight 324mm torpedoes for surface ships, which work as part of the ship's anti-submarine warfare suite.

Among common examples of torpedoes that can be used in this tube caliber are the Franco-Italian EuroTorp MU90 Impact, the American Mark 54 from Raytheon, the Italian WASS A244S, the British Stingray from BAE Systems, and the Korean K745 Blue Shark from LIGNex1.

Most of these torpedoes have a typical range of less than 15 kilometers, and are guided to their targets with a combination of active and passive acoustic homing systems.

The torpedo tubes found on the BRP Jose Rizal.

Also, the Jose Rizal-class frigates are equipped with  two C-Guard DL-6T chaff dispensers from Denmark's Terma A/S.

The C-Guard was designed to provide coverage against threats like small range gate Radio Frequency (RF) guided missiles, imaging infra-red (IR) seeker missiles, and torpedoes. It utilizes the standard 130mm NATO decoys.

Chaffs were fired from naval ships during an exercise by the Republic of China Navy (ROCN). Photo credits to ABC News.

The decoy launcher is part of a system that includes integration with the ship's combat management system (CMS), which are also interfaced with the ship's radar, electronic support measures (ESM), and other sensors.

Procurement of Torpedoes and Countermeasures:

Currently, these systems are unused due to lack of munitions and countermeasures, respectively. And this is what the Philippine Navy is trying to cover with their Frigate Lot 3 Acquisition Project. 

While the Frigates Lot 1 for the platform, and Lot 2 for the gun and missile ammunitions were procured under the Horizon 1 phase of the Revised AFP Modernization Program, this Lot 3 is actually part of the 2nd List of Horizon 2.

It was among those proposed in the original Php650 billion 2017 Horizon 2 Phase Shopping List, but was among those that were taken out of the finalized Php300 billion Horizon 2 Phase priority list approved in principle by President Rodrigo Duterte in June 2018.

But due to its urgency and the reliance on Multi-Year Contracting Authority (MYCA) procurement process which did not require the full amount of the project to be paid within the year, the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Philippine Navy were able to squeeze this project in as part of its 2nd List.

With a total of Php1,700,000,000.00 as its Approved Budget for Contracting (ABC), the Frigate Lot 3 Acquisition Project was divided into 3 sub-lots: the Lot 3A for Torpedoes with a budget of Php900 million, Lot 3B for Chaffs with a budget of Php350 million, and Lot 3C for Acoustic Decoys with a budget of Php450 million.

Lot 3A for Torpedoes will be acquired through Negotiated Procurement, which MaxDefense believes is with the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (ROK MND). This means that the procurement would be for the K745 Blue Shark torpedoes from LIGNex1, which is the only Korean-made lightweight torpedo model.

The K745 Blue Shark torpedo. Photo credits to LIGNex1 website.

This could be a practical approach for the Philippine Navy, which already has the K745 Blue Shark torpedoes in its inventory, but are actually air-launched variants that arms its AgustaWestland AW159 Wildcat ASW helicopters. These helicopters are to be deployed on the same frigates, which means commonality between the ship and its complementing helicopter's munitions.

MaxDefense PH is still trying to find out what stage of procurement is the Frigate Lot 3A already in, but our sources mentioned that so far, no contract has been signed yet as of this writing.

The PN's AW159 Wildcat are also armed with the air-dropped K745 Blue Shark torpedoes from LIGNex1. Photo credits to original source.

For Lot 3B and Lot 3C, both will be procured through Limited Source Bidding. In fact, the DND already posted the Invitation to Bid and Bid Documents at PhilGEPS Government Procurement Website on December 2020, and at the DND website on January 2021.

This means it still remains to be seen what brand and model of chaffs and acoustic decoys will be used as this would be dependent on the result of the bidding.

A US Navy serviceman loading chaffs on a countermeasures dispenser. Photo credits to US Navy.

MaxDefense is still trying to find out who are the invited bidders for the project, but based on the Supplemental Bid Bulletins released by the DND, South Africa's Rhinemetall Denel Munitions is one of the participants on the Lot 3B tender, while France's Naval Group is also participating on the Lot 3C tender.

We also found that Chemring Group was also invited to the Lot 3B, while unnamed companies from the US, Israel, and UK were also invited aside from Naval Group for Lot 3C.

Naval Group has recently been offering the CANTO acoustic torpedo decoy to regional navies like the Royal Australian Navy, which is compatible with the Terma C-Guard, as shown on the photo below.

The Naval Group's CANTO 130mm torpedo countermeasures as fitted on a Terma C-Guard decoy launcher. Photo credits to Naval Group.

Bid submission deadline for the Lot 3B Chaffs tender will be on 12 January 2021, while the Lot 3C Acoustic Decoy will be on 16 February 2021.

Due to the project being a limited source bidding, tender documents are only provided to invited tenderers, so it is expected that it won't be made available to the public. So far, the PhilGEPS and DND websites has not posted the Bid Documents that includes the technical requirements and specifications.

But what we know so far on the Chaffs and Acoustic Decoys is that they are suppose to fit into the Terma C-Guard's mortar launcher which is around 130mm diameter, standard NATO size. 

For now, all we can do is wait for the tender results, and see which company will win so we can try to find out what will potentially be ordered for the Philippine Navy.

Project Summaries:

Frigate Lot 3A - Torpedo Acquisition Project:

Note: Edited as of 06 January 2021.

* End User: Philippine Navy (Offshore Combat Force)

* Quantity: classified

* Modernization Phase: 2nd List of Horizon 2 Phase of RAFPMP

* Project ABC: Php900,000,000.00

* Acquisition Mode: Government-to-Government deal with South Korean Ministry of National Defense.

* Source of Funding: GAA Funds through AFP Modernization Program Trust Fund

* SARO Release/s: TBA

* Winning Proponent: LIGNex1 (South Korea) (not yet awarded)

* Product for Delivery: TBA

* Contract Price: TBA

* First post by MaxDefense: 31 December 2020

* MaxDefense Searching Hashtag: #PNFrigateLot3ATorpedoAcquisition 

* Status: Project is being undertaken through G2G with South Korean MND. Product of interest is K745 Blue Shark lightweight torpedo from LIGNex1. No contract has been signed although it is expected to be done before mid 2021.

X X X X X X X X X X

Frigate Lot 3B - Chaff Acquisition Project:

Note: Edited as of 06 January 2021.

* End User: Philippine Navy (Offshore Combat Force)

* Quantity: classified

* Modernization Phase: 2nd List of Horizon 2 Phase of RAFPMP

* Project ABC: Php350,000,000.00

* Acquisition Mode: Limited Source Bidding

* Source of Funding: GAA Funds through AFP Modernization Program Trust Fund

* SARO Release/s: TBA

* Winning Proponent: TBA

* Product for Delivery: TBA

* Contract Price: TBA

* First post by MaxDefense: 31 December 2020

* MaxDefense Searching Hashtag: #PNFrigateLot3BChaffAcquisition 

* Status: Project is being undertaken through Limited Source Bidding. Bid submission and opening scheduled on 12 January 2021.

X X X X X X X X X X

Frigate Lot 3C - Acoustic Decoy Acquisition Project:

Note: Edited as of 06 January 2021.

* End User: Philippine Navy (Offshore Combat Force)

* Quantity: classified

* Modernization Phase: 2nd List of Horizon 2 Phase of RAFPMP

* Project ABC: Php450,000,000.00

* Acquisition Mode: Limited Source Bidding

* Source of Funding: GAA Funds through AFP Modernization Program Trust Fund

* SARO Release/s: TBA

* Winning Proponent: TBA

* Product for Delivery: TBA

* Contract Price: TBA

* First post by MaxDefense: 31 December 2020

* MaxDefense Searching Hashtag: #PNFrigateLot3CAcousticDecoyAcquisition 

* Status: Project is being undertaken through Limited Source Bidding. Bid submission and opening scheduled on 16 February 2021 after requested to be moved by Naval Group.

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First release: 06 January 2021
Copyright MaxDefense Philippines

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Why the Philippine Navy may accept the Jose Rizal-class frigates, with or without TDLink 16 compatibility

The Philippine Navy, through its Flag Officer in Command (FOIC) Vice Adm. Giovanni Bacordo, announced on 15 May 2020 that the first of the Jose Rizal-class frigates built by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) will be leaving the shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea on 18 May 2020, and arriving in Subic Bay in the Philippines by 23 May 2020.

The announcement mentioned that frigate, the future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150). would sail with 60 Philippine Navy crewmen, and 40 Korean personnel, and the ship would undergo Technical and Acceptance Inspections once it arrives in Subic Bay.

While this appears to be good news for the Philippine Navy as the arrival marks a new milestone to their history as it becomes closer to becoming a modern navy, there are still several issues that are needing for clarity.

The first ship of the Jose Rizal-class, the future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150). Photo taken from and credited to Hyundai Heavy Industries.

Quick Background:

MaxDefense previously posted in our blogs and Facebook page that Hyundai Heavy Industries appears to have not fully met the project requirements of the Frigate Acquisition Project, which eventually became the Jose Rizal-class frigates.

While there were some minor issues that we believe can be settled later on, one major issue that hounds the project is the requirement for compatibility of the Combat Management System (CMS) with the US-NATO Tactical Data Link 16 (Link 16).

This requirement was among those agreed upon and included in the project's Contract between the Department of National Defense (DND) and Hyundai Heavy Industries that was signed on 24 October 2016 bt Defense Sec. Delfin Lorenzana, and HHI Executive Vice President Kisun Chung

HHI and its subcontractor Hanwha Systems previously confirmed in Senate hearings conducted in 2017 that the Hanwha Systems Naval Shield Integrated Combat Management System, which is the CMS installed on the new frigates, are not yet compatible to Link 16 as of then, although they are expecting it would be certified as compatible with Link 16 by 2019. 

By 2019, Hanwha Systems was not able to get the Naval Shield ICMS to be compatible with Link 16 due to reasons beyond its control. MaxDefense reiterated that the risk from 2016 was not mitigated, and has now become an actual problem. HHI and Hanwha Systems promised that the ship would be delivered with Link 16 compatibility in 2020.

The future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) during its launching in 2019 at HHI's naval shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea. Photo from Inquirer.net.

By March 2020, the PN FOIC Vice Adm. Bacordo confirmed that they are just awaiting for certification from the US on the compatibility of Naval Shield ICMS with Link 16, since only the US Link 16 Office and US DOD's Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) can provide certification. It was later confirmed that Hanwha Systems tested the Naval Shield ICMS using the Ultra Electronics Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) simulator, although Hanwha Systems and HHI failed to get actual certification from US certifiers.

Hanwha presented their Naval Shield ICMS to Philippine media during the launch of BRP Jose Rizal in 2019. Photo from Inquirer.net.

MaxDefense received information from officials familiar with the Link 16 issues that a simulation test using the Ultra Electronics ADSI, as what Hanwha Systems did, may not be sufficient reason enough for the US JITC and Link 16 office to provide certification.

If the US Link 16 Office and JITC doesn't provide any certification, the Philippine Navy risks accepting the ship that in the end, the US will not accept for installation of the Tactical Data Link 16.

The two ships of the Jose Rizal-class docked in HHI's yard in Ulsan, South Korea. Photo exclusively shared to MaxDefense Philippines.

Accepting the Frigate or Not:

It remains to be seen now if the Philippine Navy's Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee (TIAC) will accept the ship or not.

Of course it would be good news for everyone, including MaxDefense, if HHI and Hanwha Systems could REALLY provide the certification from US certifying agencies like JITC, because this means that finally, we can say that the ship is fully compliant to the requirements.

MaxDefense would even be happy for the Philippine Navy to continue with its planned Corvette Acquisition Project with HHI and Hanwha if they can prove that the Naval Shield ICMS is TDL16 compatible.

But as our last check just a few days ago, there is still no sign that a US certification was obtained by HHI and Hanwha Systems to support their claim that the Naval Shield ICMS is TDL16 compatible.

But MaxDefense believes that, despite the issues surrounding the frigates and its Combat Management System, the Philippine Navy will accept the ships.
Why the PN Would Accept the Ships, TDL16 Compatible or Not:

MaxDefense believes that despite the warnings made since 2016, and despite the Philippine Navy knowing the issues very well, the Philippine Navy would still accept the frigates, with or without the Link 16 compatibility with the Naval Shield ICMS.

There are several reasons that we believe are in the heads of the Philippine Navy's leadership, which we believe include the following:

1. RIMPAC 2020:

RIMPAC 2020 is happening in August 2020, and the Philippine Navy is said to be joining once again with the FF-150. Photo of RIMPAC 2020 logo from RIMPAC's official FB page.

One of our community members commented in our last Facebook post that the ship's "going to a party, but isn't well dressed enough". While MaxDefense believes that being "well dressed" is needed, the ship is indeed going to a party.

MaxDefense has received confirmation that the Philippine Navy is joining the Rim of the Pacific Exercises 2020, which is scheduled in August 2020 in Hawaii, USA. And guess which ship is the Philippine Navy sending?

Yes, its no other than the future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150), which is expected to be commissioned with the Philippine Navy by then. MaxDefense is expected that a shipboard helicopter will accompany the frigate, but it still remains to be seen if the PN will send the new AgustaWestland AW159 Mk220 Wildcat, or the older and less capable AgustaWestland AW109E Power naval helicopter.

The exercises is expected to only have the At Sea Phase due to the COVID-19 pandemic still expected to be ongoing. So the PN is only sending a combat ship, unlike in 2018 when it sent a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Landing Platform Dock. 

RIMPAC 2020 is happpening. Photo from US Navy.

2. Pressure from Greased Public Officials:

It would be remembered that as early as April 2020, MaxDefense already received word that Hyundai Heavy Industries is already pushing for the delivery of the frigate, and has already sent their people to meet "people with influence" within the Philippine government.

Despite the issues on the frigate being very obvious, the deal still pushed through according to HHI's wishes despite not legally questionable. This means that there are questionable activities happening in the backstage of the show.

If the frigate's acceptance is delayed, it means more expenses for HHI since the Philippine government cannot release the milestone payments for the ship's delivery. Based on the project's payment terms and delivery schedule included in the contract, HHI will be paid 10% of the contract price and reach a total of 80% of the contract price by the time the 1st frigate is accepted and delivered to the Philippine Navy.

It would be favorable for HHI to spend a little more just to get this project moving forward. And that "little more" may include "grease" for our officials.


3. Philippine Navy's Desperation for Additional Hulls:

Just a few weeks ago, the Philippine Navy just had one of its major surface combat asset, the Del Pilar-class frigate BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS-16) in a minor accident off the coast of India. While the damage appears to be minimal, MaxDefense received information from Navy sources that it might taken several months for a complete repair to be made, that is even with assistance from the US Navy's Naval Sea Systems Command.

If true, this means the BRP Ramon Alcaraz may not be available for service for almost the entire remaining months of 2020.

This is not a good timing for the Philippine Navy, since it is in the process of retiring three (3) more World War 2-era warships within 2020, while its sistership BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PS-15) is still under repair and is not expected to return to service until mid to late 2021 as it will proceed with upgrade works in late 2020 or early 2021 even after repairs on the ship are done.

The BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PS-15) has not yet recovered from the damages it took in 2018. It is expected that repairs would be completed by 2020, although the ship is lined for upgrade works in early 2021. Photo from Inquirer.net.

This means that only the Del Pilar-class frigate BRP Andres Bonifacio (PS-17) and the Pohang-class corvette BRP Conrado Yap (PS-39) remain as the only available major surface combatants of the Philippine Navy as of this writing. The addition of the future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) would boost the Philippine Navy's hull availability

The PN only has the Pohang-class corvette BRP Conrado Yap (PS-39) and the Del Pilar-class frigate BRP Andres Bonifacio (PS-17) as its main surface combatants at the moment. Photo from PN.

4.  Obtaining Assistance from South Korean Government:

The acceptance of the future BRP Jose Rizal may also be tied to other projects that the Philippine Navy is trying to close with the South Korean government. 

One is obtaining soft loans to support the Corvette Acquisition Project which the DND and PN are pushing to be awarded to a Korean shipbuilder (most likely HHI).

The Philippine Navy plans to acquire 2 new corvettes, which is said to be based on an improved version of the Jose Rizal-class frigates, and would be built again by HHI. Photo shared exclusively to MaxDefense.

The other is obtaining excess defense articles from the South Korean Ministry of Defense, which may include a second or even a third decommissioned Pohang-class corvette formerly used by the Republic of Korea Navy.

Allowing the frigate to be accepted without too much question will give the DND and PN more bargaining power with the South Korean government for both proposed projects. 

The Philippine Navy is after the acquisition of additional decommissioned Pohang-class corvettes from the South Korean government.

5. Liquidated Damages:

If the frigates remain undelivered, HHI is expected to get penalized and could be paying for Liquidated Damages (LD) as stipulated in the contract annexes. It would be remembered that HHI promised to deliver the ship in April 2020, although the COVID-19 pandemic may be a valid reason for the delays. But further delays may not be acceptable enough to be considered as an aftereffect of COVID-19 issues.

HHI will try its best to push the DND and PN to accept the ships, so that HHI won't be paying for the LD and lose more money in the process.

For those who are not familiar with commercial contracts, paying Liquidated Damages is a damning thing for a company to do because it is considered a loss for any company to do so.

6. Protecting HHI and the South Korean Defense Industry's Image and Credibility:

For HHI to unable to deliver the frigates on time or for the wrong reasons would hit the company's credibility and image globally. The Philippine Navy's frigate is not a complicated project compared to many of its previous accomplishments, and HHI is expected to complete the deal with ease.

Not only HHI's credibility will be affected, but also by Hanwha Systems and the entire South Korean defense industry too, which is aiming to be one of the largest in the world in terms of export sales.

It is expected that the South Korean government, and by extension HHI and Hanwha Systems, would do everything to keep their save the reputation of their defense industry, considering Koreans are known to be very sensitive in issues that will damage their credibility, image, reputation, and pride in the global market scene.

More Issues than the Link 16 Compatibility?

Prior to finishing this blog entry, MaxDefense received more information from Philippine Navy sources that the Link 16 compatibility issue with the Combat Management System appears to be just a minor issue now. Not much was provided to us, but it only means that there are other pressing issues on the project. But we'll probably leave that for now as we would need more time to gather more information.

An infographic of the subsystems of the  Jose Rizal-class frigate. So what else could be experiencing problems here aside from the CMS? Photo from Inquirer.net.

MaxDefense and its entire defense community hopes that the Philippine Navy, especially its leadership and the Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee (TIAC) and Project Management Team (PMT) would do its job well for the sake of the Philippine Navy's and the Philippines' interests.

Project Summary:
Frigate Acquisition Project Lot 1 - Frigate Platform with Launchers

Note: Edited as of 17 May 2020:

* End User: Philippine Navy (Offshore Combat Force)

* Quantity: 2 units

* Modernization Phase: Horizon 1 phase Priority Projects of RAFPMP

* Project ABC: Php16,000,000,000.00

* Acquisition Mode: 2-Stage Public Bidding

* Source of Funding: TBA

* SARO Release: TBA

* Winning Proponent: Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) of South Korea

* Product for Delivery: HDF-2600 frigate (Jose Rizal-class)

* Contract Price: Php15,744,571,584.00

* Residual Amount: Php255,428,416.00

* Expected Delivery: PN expects first ship by May 2020, second by September/October 2020.


* First post by MaxDefense: 02 May 2013

* Searching Hashtag: #PNFrigateAcquisition #PNFAP

* Status: First ship, future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) scheduled for delivery and arriving in the Philippines by 23 May 2020. Second ship, future BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151) undergoing dockside completion works, in preparation for sea trials.

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First edit and release: 17 May 2020

Copyright MaxDefense Philippines

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FF-150 it is! Future BRP Jose Rizal shows its hull number...and TASS concerns

Note: this is a MaxDefense shortblog. thus the length of the entry. 

A lot of things have happened since MaxDefense made an exclusive post in our Facebook community page last 25 January 2019 on what the ship's name (which automatically names the class name) and pennant number of the first new frigate being built by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) in their yard in Ulsan, South Korea.

This was based on a photo of the frigate Jose Rizal as of April 2019. In this photo, the pennant number pained in the hull is not yet there. Photo exclusively shared to MaxDefense by source.

Many did not believe what we reported and confirmed,until the Secretary of National Defense (SND) himself announcement later on that the first ship HHI is constructing (internally labelled as "P159" by HHI and PN in their project name), is to be named "Jose Rizal" (the "BRP" will be added once the ship is commissioned officially to the Philippine Navy). 

But so far, none even from the DND and the PN have confirmed our previous announcement that the ship's hull/pennant number will be "FF-150" for the first ship, and "FF-151" for the second frigate which will be named "Antonio Luna". 

Now that HHI has finally painted the ship's hull as the ship's launching comes near, it is very clear now if what we previously announced was right or wrong.

See for yourself.

As the launching date for the HHI-built frigate Jose Rizal is nearing, the ship is finally getting clearer, including its hull/pennant number. 

It should be noted that based on the latest Philippine Navy ship classification standard which was revised on April 2016, frigates in the Philippine Navy will have the prefix "FF". So in this case, the future BRP Jose Rizal will have the pennant number FF-150.

The Main Concern:

With the stern of the ship now visible, MaxDefense raises this question to the Philippine Navy: if the Towed Array Sonar System (TASS) is a Fitted for But Not With (FFBNW) subsystem for the Jose Rizal-class frigates, then why is the stern of the ship so clean, without even an opening provided for the use of a TASS in the future? Based on previous documents from the Philippine Navy, the original Technical Working Group (TWG) selected the Thales CAPTAS-2 towed array sonar system, and is actually looking at the newer and smaller CAPTAS-4 as an alternative.

Edit: we'll replace the photo of the Incheon-class frigate's stern since there are some quarters making noise that the ship doesn't have TASS. Anyway...

Warships with openings for Towed Array Sonar, in this case, specifically using the Thales CAPTAS family which have large tow bodies that require large holes in the stern. Top photo shows the smaller CAPTAS-4 in the Bergamini-class, and bottom photo shows the larger and older CAPTAS-2 system in a Royal Navy warship.
Credits to owners/sources of the photos.

In fact, the Philippine Navy even included in its Technical Specs that the frigate shall have space and power provision for a Towed Array Sonar, even indicating the size of the projector towed body for the shipbuilder to consider. The size provided actually was based on the Thales CAPTAS-2's towed body.

Photo taken from Supplementary Bid Bulletin DND/PN-FAP-16-01 dated 02 February 2016, months before the bidding date. Document from DND website.

Here's more evidence: this came from a section plan of the frigate. It shows that there is no room for a TASS below the helicopter deck, and instead the space is for Steering Gear Emeregency Steering Room. 

No TASS space below the helicopter deck just behind the stern. This came from HHI's own drawing of the frigate.
Photo exclusively shared by a MaxDefense contributor who saw our discussions.

The ship's launching is approaching fast, which is expected to be sometime between 17-19 May 2019. MaxDefense will make the final confirmation soon, as everything can still change depending on the availability of DND officials to grace the event in South Korea, or depending on circumstances in HHI's yard.

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Philippine Navy Starts Procurement of Gun Munitions for new Jose Rizal-class Frigates

The Philippine Navy (PN), through the Philippines' Department of National Defense (DND) has finally started the procurement process for some sub-lots of the Philippine Navy’s Frigate Acquisition Project – Lot 2 covering ammunition for the upcoming Jose Rizal-class frigates.

A CGI image of the Philippine Navy's upcoming Jose Rizal-class frigates.
Photo taken from Hyundai Heavy Industries website.

In two separate Invitations to Bid (ITB) posted by the DND last 31 January 2019, they announced the bidding of two sub-lots under Lot 2C covering naval gun ammunition, with the following details:

* Lot 2C Sub-lot 1: 76mm Ammunition with an Approved Budget of Contract (ABC) of Php77,536,964.00.

The Oto Melara 76mm/62 calibre Super Rapid naval gun, which will be the main gun of the Jose Rizal-class frigates.
Photo taken from Leonardo's website.

* Lot 2C Sub-lot 2: 30mm Ammunition with an ABC of Php100,000,000.00. This covers the acquisition of: 6,000 rounds of 30mm High Explosive Incendiary (HEI), 4,000 rounds of Target Practice Tracer (TPT), and 4 units of Cut-Away models of both HEI and TPT rounds.

The Aselsan SMASH 30mm RCWS using the Bushmaster Mk44 30mm autocannon.
Photo taken from Aselsan's website.

Both sub-projects would be implemented under a Public Bidding mode of procurement.

The Philippine Navy is an existing user of the CTG 76mm ammunition, as it already has the Oto Melara Mark 75 76mm/62 caliber Compact naval gun in its arsenal. The same munitions will be used for the Jose Rizal-class frigates which features an Oto Melara 76mm/62 caliber Super Rapid naval gun.

The same is true for the CTG 30mm x 173 ammunition, which is also being used on the Oerlikon KCB 30mm guns installed on the Emerlec twin gun weapon mounts used on some of the PN’s Kagitingan-class and Tomas Batilo-class patrol boats.

With the Jose Rizal-class frigates, the munitions will be used by the Aselsan SMASH remote controlled weapon system (RCWS) which mounts the Bushmaster Mk44 30mm autocannon. Both frigates are armed with 1 such system.



As for the missiles and torpedoes for the Jose Rizal-class frigates, these would be purchased under a Government-to-Government (G2G) deal with specific countries since the approved weapon systems was I cluded in the submission made by the frigate builder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) during the 2nd Stage bidding of the Frigate Acquisition Project Lot 1.

The anti-ship missiles will be the LIGNex1 SSM-700K C-Star missile from South Korea, while the short range anti-aircraft missile would be the MBDA Mistral from France. The torpedo is expected to be the LIGNex1 K745 Blue Shark lightweight Anti-Submarine torpedo also from South Korea.

MaxDefense expects the DND and PN to start the actual procurement of these munitions also within 2019.

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Philippine Navy's 2nd New Frigate to Conduct its First Steel Cutting Ceremonies

After a long break on discussions regarding the Philippine Navy's upcoming future frigates being built by Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) under the Frigate Acquisition Project (FAP) of the Horizon 1 phase of the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RAFPMP), there are some important updates on the construction works of the warships.

The scale models of the two future frigates of the Philippine Navy, as provided by HHI to PN.
Photos provided exclusively to MaxDefense by one of our contributor.

According to official documents from the Philippine Navy (PN) and Department of National Defense (DND), the 2nd frigate, called internally by HHI as hull P160, should be scheduled to have its First Steel Cutting Ceremony tomorrow, 17 September 2018 at HHH's shipyard in South Korea. That is if there are no changes and problems encountered by HHI, or if the DND does not request to move the date as defense officials are currently busy on the aftermath of Typhoon Ompong / Mangkhut which may affect their attendance. No word though on who will represent the Philippines although it is expected that officials from the DND and PN would be there. So far the update was given only very recently, so we expect that HHI may not have any problems, and if DND doesn'ask for a schedule change, there is no other reason for the ceremony to not push through on 17 September 2018 as planned.

Photo was taken during the 1st frigate P159's First Steel Cutting Ceremony held in HHI's Shipyard in South Korea last 01 May 2018. A similar event will happen on 17 September 2018 for the 2nd frigate P160.
Photo taken from BusinessKorea website.

Meanwhile, the 1st frigate which is internally called by HHI as P159, is sheduled to have its Keel Laying Ceremonies on 16 October 2018.

Last May 2018, MaxDefense mentioned in a wall post that the 2nd Frigate's First Steel Cutting Ceremony is scheduled on September 2018. This means HHI's construction of the 2nd frigate is on schedule, and may reflect on HHI's accomplishments on the 1st frigate, as the production line is dependent on the accomplishments on the construction of the 1st frigate P159.

The scale model of the PN's future frigate as provided by HHI to the Philippine Navy.
Photo shared exclusively to MaxDefense by one of our contributor.

So far MaxDefense received information that several of the blocks of the 1st frigate P159 are completed, while many more are almost done, or will be done by the time keep laying starts next month. PN reports that HHI is confident that HHI will meet the scheduled Keel Laying Ceremony by 18 October 2018.

MaxDefense will provide updates on the First Steel Cutting of P160, as we expect news to be coming out days after the event. The same is also true on the Keel Laying Ceremony of 2nd frigate P159 on October 2018.

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Comparing the Air/Surface Search Radar Options for the Philippine Navy's Future Frigate versus Technical Specifications

For the past 2 years since 2016, MaxDefense had been discussing the Frigate Acquisition Program for the Philippine Navy, including the fact that Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) submitted 2 options for the different subsystems of the frigates.

While the Combat Management System (CMS) was discussed too publicly to the point that it even became a nationwide issue, which we all know what happened next. MaxDefense also mentioned several times especially in our Facebook posts that the CMS issue is just the tip of the iceberg, as the CMS affects most of the important subsystems like the sensors and surveillance systems of the frigates.

Aside from the CMS, another subsystem where HHI submitted 2 options is the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR), which is the most important surveillance sensor of the frigates. MaxDefense will discuss about the ASSR in this blog entry.

The Airbus (now Hensoldt) TRS-3D, which is among the 2 options provided by HHI for the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR) requirement, and HHI's preferred choice.
Photo taken from Hensoldt's website.

The other option HHI submitted for the frigate's ASSR is the Thales Nederland NS100 series of 3D AESA naval radar, one of the latest naval radars in the market today.
Photo taken from Thales' website.

The Air/Surface Search Radar System:

The Philippine Navy released an initial version of the Technical Specifications prior to the 1st Stage Bidding of the Frigate held on 04 December 2013. MaxDefense was able to discuss it in a blog entry for the frigate:

"Philippine Navy Frigate Acquisition Project - An Anaysis of the 1st Stage Bidding Specifications" - dated 09 October 2013.


MaxDefense believes that the initial specs were too general and too basic, and shows total lack of understanding on the subsystem. It also separated the requirements for air search and surface search, despite current technology having a single radar system that covers both requirements.

This was later on replaced by a more specific Technical Specifications. Not only did it combined the air search and surface search requirements into a single system, but it increased the performance values too.

This new requirements was also discussed in a previous MaxDefense blog entry:

"The Philippine Navy's Frigate Acquisition Program Finally Moves in 2016! New Technical Specification Released And Tender Soon" - dated 07 February 2016



Below shows the Technical Specifications as of 2013 (left) and 2015 (right) for the Air/Surface Search Radar as shown on the Supplemental Bid Bulletin Nr. DND/PN-FAP-16-01 released on 02 February 2016. The same can be seen on Page 26 of the Statement of Compliance form as provided under Supplemental Bid Bulletin Nr. DND/PN-FAP-16-03 released on 17 February 2016.

This is the Technical Specifications for the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR) system. The left is the old specs used in the 1st Stage bidding, and the right one is the updated specs used in the 2nd (and final) Stage Bidding, which is the prevailing version of the technical specs. No additional capabilities were added later on.
Photo cropped from the SBB No. DND/PN-FAP-16-01 dated 2 February 2016.

Important Points of the ASSR Technical Specifications:

Among the most important points of the ASSR's Technnical Specs are as follows:

1. Instrumented Range - should be at least 100 nautical miles for air targets and 40 nautical miles for surface targets.

This means that the radar should, at its maximum capability in the best weather (clear) conditions, should be able to see air targets of any size 100 nautical miles away from the radar (or the ship in general), or a surface target of any size from 40 nautical miles away from the radar. Surface target could be anything in the sea surface or the ground surface. This the most common feature that is used to determine if a radar system is superior over the another system, although in reality this should not be the case.

Take note: Surface targets only require a smaller range as radars detection of surface targets is limited due to the Earth's curvature. Microwave beams travel in straight lines/path.

Converting to kilometers, 40 nautical miles = 74.08 kilometers, while 100 nautical miles = 185.2 kilometers.



2. Tracking Capacity - should be at least 750 tracks for air and surface tracks.

The radar should be able to detect and track (or see) at least 750 air and surface targets at any given time. This is very useful in areas with high volume of military and commercial sea and air traffic like the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea where large commercial and naval ships are mixed up with small fishing boats, plus a large volume of commercial airline flight routes mixed up with military aircraft. MaxDefense believes that 750 tracks is a decent capability considering most new surveillance radar systems can track more than that.


3. Detection Range - minimum of 200 meters up to a maximum of instrumented range 

This means that aside from the ASSR to be able to see naval and ground targets at 40 nautical miles away, and air targets at 100 nautical miles away from the ship, the ASSR should also be able to see such targets to as close as 200 meters away from the ship. Radar systems do not normally see any target very close to the transmitter itself (like a ship berthed side by side with the ship it is equipped), and detection can only be made from a certain distance.  Surprisingly, the 200 meter requirement is considered too much since most modern radars can have a minimum range of less than 100 meters.

4. Azimuth Coverage - 360 Degrees

This means that the radar's maximum detection coverage allows it to see targets in all directions, which also means that the radar antenna has the capacity to turn at 360 degrees to be able to do this. This is standard in today's radar technology although it is right to include it in the technical specs.


5. Transmitter - Solid State

Solid state refers to the technology used for the radar system to transmit microwave signals. It is the current technology used in radars, replacing the old Magnetron-based technology whose performance is not as good, is less reliable, requires more power to use, and is physically larger and heavier, among others.


6. The Radar is primarily used for air and surface surveillance and acquisition and must be capable of quickly detecting and accurately locating air and surface contacts, and detection of sea skimming missiles at a minimum altitude of 10 feet to allow fire control resources sufficient time to lock-on and engage

This is a specification forgotten by many other discussions online about the Frigate's ASSR. The desciption is actually divided into two parts. First is the description of the ASSR, while the second part (underlined) is the actual specification, which is for the ASSR to be able to detect sea-skimming missiles at a minimum altitude of 10 feet.



MaxDefense believes that despite these requirements in the technical specification, it still lack enough information that allows it to be more specific to what it really requires. Among them include the lack of requirement on the radar's detection chance of specific targets with a given Radar Cross Section in a certain environment model, or the maximum elevation azimuth coverage of the radar system, both of which are also very important requirements.

This photo above was cropped from the Computer Generated Image provided by Hyundai Heavy Industries (top) of what the Philippine Navy's future frigate may look like once completed. Surprisingly, the ASSR antenna is strikingly the same as the antenna of the Thales Nederland NS100. Anyone could compare the antenna profile since there are numerous online photos of what the antennas of TRS-3D and NS100 look like.
Photo taken from Hyundai Heavy Industries' website.

 The Options Submitted by Hyundai Heavy Industries:

During the Submission and Opening of Bid Envelopes (SOBE) for the Frigate Acquisition on 17 March 2016, only two bidders were declared to be able to proceed with the acquisition process. Among them was Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), which was declared the 2nd lowest bidder after Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) of India. HHI  submitted 2 options for the Air/Surface Search Radar Systems: The Thales Nederland NS100 series AESA radar system, and the Airbus TRS-3D series radar system.


While other defense pages condemn MaxDefense, saying that our posts and information are half lies and innuendos, long-time MaxDefense readers and community members know that those accusations are false made by biased groups with vested interests in criticizing MaxDefense. The photo below was cropped from the actual Makers List submitted by HHI and included in the FAP's Contract signed last October 24, 2016. It clearly shows that HHI did offer 2 options for the ASSR. MaxDefense believes that no other defense page

The above shows the options submitted by HHI for the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR), which are the TNL (Thales Nederland) NS100 and the Airbus TRS-3D. Confirmation was made to MaxDefense that the specific versions being offered were the NS106 and the TRS-3D Baseline D. It also shows that HHI did offer 2 options for the CMS, although there is only 1 option for the Navigation Radar. MaxDefense decided to blur the other items for now and focus more on the ASSR.
Photo cropped from the FAP Contract's Annex F.

MaxDefense was lucky enough to be among the few who got access to the actual submissions made by GRSE and HHI, which allowed us to discuss them thoroughly through the years fro 2016 until the present.

Thales Nederland NS106 is a derivative of the newly developed but already successful NS100 series of AESA naval radars, and was said to be the actual model HHI is offering from the series. It takes improved performance over the older Thales Smart-S Mk. 2 radar, and uses Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technology which is the latest technology in radar systems due to its ability to control beamed radio waves without the need to move the antenna, or require moving parts for the antenna.

The NS106 is a smaller version of the NS100, designed specifically for use on smaller warships from Offshore Patrol Vessels to small frigates. Its latest user is the Republic of Singapore Navy's Independence-class Littoral Missions Vessels.

The Thales Nederland NS100 series, which includes the NS106, uses AESA technology, and is among the latest naval radars in the market today. Despite being new, it is already in service with different navies.
Photo taken from Thales Nederland's website.

The latest user of the Thales Nederland NS100 (NS106) 3D AESA Radar is the Republic of Singapore Navy, installing them on the new Independence-class Littoral Missions Vessels. It would be noted that Singapore is among the most stringent in defense procurement, making sure that they get the best military technology to compensate for their lack of manpower.
Photo taken from Singapore's Ministry of Defence.

Meanwhile the Airbus (now Hensoldt) TRS-3D radar is in the global radar market for almost 15 years now, and is a proven product in use by several navies. It is actual a direct competitor of the Thales Smart-S Mk. 2, and uses the older pencil-beam technology, which is already being replaced in the market by the AESA technology. The TRS-3D is now marketed by the German company Hensoldt, which originated from Airbus' electronics business unit. The TRS-3D's latest user includes the US Coast Guard's Legend-class National Security Cutter.

MaxDefense received confirmation that the actual variant being offered by HHI is the current Baseline D variant, the same variant used by the USCG Legend-class NSC.

The latest version of Hensoldt's TRS-3D, the TRS-3D Baseline D, is being used by the US Coast Guard's Legend-class National Security Cutters. The Baseline D is said to be the one being offered by HHI to the PN, being the variant being produced by Hensoldt.
Credits to source of photo.

Philippine Navy's Technical Specifications versus the Radar's Specifications:

Now we compare if the two radars comply with the technical specifications for the Frigate Acquisition Program, based on publicly-available information.

Spec #1. Instrumented Range - should be at least 100 nautical miles (185 kilometres) for air targets and 40 nautical miles (74 kilometres) for surface targets.

Based on Thales Nederland's own product data sheet found in their website, the NS100 has a Maximum Instrumented Range of 280 kilometres, and a Maximum Range of 80 kilometres for surface targets. These are way beyond the 185 kilometres (air search) and 74 kilometres (surface search) required as per technical specs. 

And based on Hensoldt's own product data sheet also found in their website, the TRS-3D has a Maximum Instrumented Range of 200 kilometers, also beyond the requirement provided by the technical specs.

Based on this simple requirement, both the NS100 and TRS-3D comply with the technical specifications.

But based on information not released to the public by radar manufacturers, the TRS-3D has deficiencies due to the older technology it uses. 

It appears that the TRS-3D only has the capacity to meet this requirement is the 6s mode, which is an update time of every 6 seconds. The TRS-3D has a corresponding update time between 1 to 6 seconds (6s, 3.5s, 3s and 1s) with the 6s only meeting the maximum range requirements. This is due to the use of older Pencil-beam technology which requires the operator to choose from different search modes or patterns during operation. Example, there is a different mode and performance values when the radar is required to do horizon search against sea-skimming targets, and in conducting target acquisition, and in conducting volume search. In short, there is a compromise whenever the operator requires to use a different mode of operation while using the TRS-3D.

This is where an AESA-technology radar shows its value and better performance, as AESA radars do not require such compromise as it can perform all modes simultaneously. Meaning, it can do volume search, target acquisition, and horizon search on sea-skimming targets all at the same time.

Since the technical specifications does not indicate this requirement, the TRS-3D would actually be compliant with the PN's specs, although it is apparent here that the NS100 (and NS106) performs way better due to use of superior technology.

Spec #2. Tracking Capacity - should be at least 750 tracks for air and surface tracks.

Based on the same sources, the Thales Nederland NS100 has an air/surface track load of up to 1,000 tracks at a maximum, while Hensoldt TRS-3D only a maximum tracking capacity of more than 400 targets.

Given that manufacturers do not fully disclose the real maximum capabilities of their products, MaxDefense can assume it could be +5% to +10% more than the posted values. This gives the TRS-3D a theoretical maximum tracking capability at 440 to 450 targets.

Despite the use of a 10% allowance, it shows here than the Hensoldt TRS-3D does not meet the technical specifications for the frigates, while Thales Nederland NS100 can track twice more than the its competitor, and easily surpass the technical specifications by 25% more, thus the NS100 meets the technical specs easily.

Here alone, it is easy to say that Hensoldt TRS-3D should be disqualified from being used as the ASSR for the Philippine Navy's future frigates for failing to meet a technical specification requirement.

Spec #3. Detection Range - minimum of 200 meters up to a maximum of instrumented range 

Still based on the same sources as the other specs, the Thales Nederland NS100 has a minimum range of 15 meters, and a maximum range of 280 kilometres. Meaning, the NS100 exceeds the required minimum range, and also exceeds the required maximum range.

Meanwhile, the Hensoldt TRS-3D has a minimum range of 200 meters, which meets the requirement, while having a maximum range of 200 kilometers. Thus, the TRS-3D meets both the minimum and maximum range required by the technical specifications.

This is very important especially in law enforcement duties, since the radar is capable of detecting small boats very close to the frigate. While 200 meters is visible to the eye, it could be different during the night when darkness could work well for the approaching boat if their intention is unfavourable for the frigate. 

Spec #4. Azimuth Coverage - 360 Degrees

Based on both the product specification data sheets of both radar systems, the Thales Nederland NS100 and Hensoldt TRS-3D are both compliant with an azimuth coverage of 360 degrees.

Spec #5. Transmitter - Solid State

Both the Thales Nederland NS100 and Hensoldt TRS-3D uses Solid State transmitter technology, thus both are compliant with the solid state requirements.

Solid State transmitter technology is the latest in radar technology, replacing the Magnetron-based technology that has been used since the 1940s.
Photo taken from Toshiba's website.

Spec #6. Detection of sea skimming missiles at a minimum altitude of 10 feet to allow fire control resources sufficient time to lock-on and engage

This requirement is something that were not indicated in the product data sheets available online for both products. Thus requiring MaxDefense to use information that are not available to the public.

MaxDefense won't be too specific on the actual minimum altitude range that both radars can detect sea-skimming missiles due to obvious reasons. But MaxDefense confirms that both the NS100 and TRS-3D can detect a sea-skimming missile at a minimum altitude of 10 feet above the sea surface.

This requirement is important as most anti-ship missiles fly towards the ship by flying as close to the sea surface as possible. Between 15 to 10 feet above sea level is actually a typical elevation used by many anti-ship missiles when sea-skimming.

Modern anti-ship missiles usually approach targeted ships at very low altitude, usually less than 20 feet from the sea surface.
Photo taken from Lockheed Martin's website.

But this again would be something where superior technology creates a difference. The TRS-3D can do detection of sea-skimming targets only in the 1s mode with a maximum detection range of 11.3 nautical miles (20.9 kilometers). Meaning, if the radar is being used at other modes (3s, 3.5s or 6s), the TRS-3D cannot detect sea-skimming targets.

Meanwhile, the AESA technology of the NS100 allows it to operate in all aspects without the need to change modes of operation to do sea-skimming detection and volume search, thus the NS100 can detect sea-skimming targets at all times.

These performance figures are very important in today's battlefield to allow the ship's crews to react faster from threats, considering that anti-ship missiles are now travelling faster than ever.

Conclusion:

Based on the technical specifications, it appears that Thales Nederland NS100 meets all the requirements, and even exceeded them with ease. 

Meanwhile, while Hensoldt TRS-3D met certain requirements, it failed to meet Specification #2, thus it automatically means that the TRS-3D does not meet the technical specifications of the project.

It would have been better if HHI offered the Hensoldt's newer and more capable ASSR, the TRS-4D AESA naval radar, which, after MaxDefense's own assessment versus the technical specifications of the project, complies with all requirements. TRS-4D is actually the direct competitor of the NS100, and uses the same technology and evenly matches in every aspect of capability and technology. Too bad HHI prefer to go cheap rather than fair.

Now, since based on the arguments pointed out by the Department of National Defense and the current leadership of the Philippine Navy is that Hyundai Heavy Industries will be the one who has the sole right to choose the subsystems for the frigate, MaxDefense believes that HHI will definitely use the Hensoldt TRS-3D radar for the frigates.

Not only is the TRS-3D cheaper by almost US$400,000 per unit compared to the NS106, but TRS-3D is compatible with the Hanwha Systems Naval Shield ICMS, this is due to the TRS-3D being in the market for almost 2 decades now, whereas the NS106 is not compatible yet due to NS106 being a newer product that has never been matched together with the Naval Shield and is not in service with the Republic of Korea Navy.

This is the bottom part of HHI's Makers List which is attached to the contract and signed by HHI and PN TWG Legal Officer Maj. Dayao. While it says that HHI has the sole right for the final selection for subsystems, the equipment shall fulfil the owner's requirements in building specifications and other design & build aspects. Since TRS-3D does not meet certain technical specification requirements, legally it should not be used for the frigate. But is NS100/NS106 compatible with Hanwha Naval Shield ICMS?
Photo cropped from HHI's Makers List as attached to the FAP contract.

But all parties, the PN TIAC and PMT, the DND and DND-Defense Acquisition Office, and HHI should remember that the clause also says "as long as equipment/sensor shall fulfill the owner's requirements in building specifications and other design & build aspects". So if HHI insists in using the Hensoldt TRS-3D, they are breaching the Technical Specifications, and in effect, breaching the contract of the project.

With the PN's TIAC already signed last 23 March 2018 according to our sources from the DND and the PN, its only a matter of time when a formal document will be made signifying the final equipment fit-out of the frigates. And MaxDefense would be there to cover that.

  

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