Upcoming Tranche of Security Aid from China to the Philippines Revealed

Last June we posted a blog entry discussing the initial delivery of Chinese security assistance grant provided to the Philippine government, which was agreed upon during one of the meetings between the Chinese and Philippine leaders.

Based on previous press releases by the Philippine government, the Chinese security grant is worth around US$14.4 million and is said to be composed of sniper rifles, fast boats and rocket propelled grenades, although there were also previous statements including drones, force protection equipment, and other items into the expected aid.

While we do not have any photo of the actual patrol craft model for delivery from China, MaxDefense expects it to be somehow similar in size to the one on top, which is a different high speed boat made in China for law enforcement agencies. This particular boat model was actually among those offered to the Bureau of Customs for their own patrol craft requirement.
Photo taken from Datang Holdings product brochure.

Recap - First Tranche Aid Delivery:

This has been discussed in our earlier MaxDefense blog, which can be accessed here:
"Armed Forces of the Philippines Receives First Shipment of Defense Aid from China" - dated June 30, 2017.

Based on official statements from the government, China delivered the first tranche of the security aid last June, composed of 3,000 Norinco CQ-A5 5.56 x 45mm semi-automatic carbines, and 90 sniper rifles shared between the Norinco Type 85 "Dragunov" 7.62 x 54R marksman rifles, and the Norinco CS/LR4A 7.62 x 51mm sniper rifles, plus assorted ammunition composed of 5,000,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45mm rifle rounds, 800,000 7.62mm sniper rifle rounds. These were brought in to Clark Air Base last June 28, 2017 through four Ilyushin Il-76 strategic airlift aircraft of the People's Liberation Army Air Force.

MaxDefense's own analysis put the sniper rifles at 60 Type 85s and 30 CS/LR4As, based on photos available on the turn-over ceremony. The CS/LR4A came in hard plastic containers and includes Type CS/ON3A low light sighting scopes.

According to sources, the total worth of this tranche is around US$7 million, which means the Philippines is expecting another US$7 million worth of deliveries. Most of the CQ-A5 carbines and Type 85 Dragunov marksman rifles were turned over by the DND to the Philippine National Police, while some will be used for testing and study, probably by the Government Arsenal. Only the CS/LR4A sniper rifles appear to remain with the AFP, with some photos already coming out of the rifle being used by the Philippine Army in Marawi City.

This is not the first time China provided aid to Philippine security forces, with China actually donating several construction equipment to the AFP during Pres. Arroyo's term, which were used mostly by the Philippine Army's Engineering Brigades.

Pres. Duterte himself was present during the formal hand-over of the 1st tranche of Chinese defense assistance to the Philippines last June 28, 2017 at Clark Air Base.
Credits to owner of photo.

Second Tranche - What's Expected:

New statements from the government mentioned that the second tranche of deliveries will be coming in soon, estimated to be sometime between August and November 2017.  But it is unclear which items are included, or if there will be a third tranche of deliveries.

Based on AFP Modernization Program update documents that MaxDefense was able to obtain, the 3,000 Norinco CQ-A5 carbines are actually part of an Urgent Military Assistance Gratis, and the inclusion of the ammunition and sniper rifles were just made later on instead of delivering them separately.

Also, it confirmed MaxDefense's earlier analysis on the quantity of sniper rifles. The delivery was indeed for 60 Norinco Type 85 "Dragunov" marksman rifles and 30 CS/LR4A sniper rifles.

The distribution of ammunition was also confirmed. The AFP did receive 20,000 rounds of Type CS BFL3A 7.62 x 51 ammunition for the CS/LR4A sniper rifles, and 800,000 rounds of 7.62 x 54R munitions for the Dragunovs. Take note that these Dragunov marksman rifles uses a different ammunition round compared to what the AFP and PNP are using.


Also on the same document, the Philippines is also scheduled to receive the following items on the next tranche of deliveries:

* 4 units of Type 966Y Patrol Craft with 7.62mm Multi-purpose Machine Guns
* 200 units of Norinco Type 69 Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers
* 2,000 rounds of 40mm High Explosive Anti-Tank for the Type 69 RPGs
* 3,000 rounds of 40mm High Explosive Incendiary for the Type 69 RPGs
* 60 units of CS/ON6 Low-Light Sights for the Type 85 Dragunov marksman rifles
* 30 units of CS/ON8A Low-Light Sights for the CS/LR4A sniper rifles

Surprisingly, the CS/LR4A sniper rifles delivered last June 2017 included what appears to be a 4x sniper scope, while the Dragunovs appear to not have their scopes. So the deliver of additional sights for the CS/LR4A rifles is unusual, although the sights for the Dragunovs is highly expected.

Among the rifles delivered by China in its first tranche of security aid to the Philippines. Shown are the CS/LR4A sniper rifle, the CQ-A5 carbine, and two Type 85 marksman rifles.
Credits to owner of photo.

Type 966Y Patrol Craft:

So far MaxDefense has been unsuccessful in getting information on this type of patrol boat, but it is expected that the would probably be an inshore patrol craft, probably less than 15 meters long, with high speed exceeding 40 knots, and is armed with a single 7.62mm machine gun. It is highly possible that the design of the boat is similar to those used by the China Coast Guard or the People's Armed Police units.

MaxDefense anticipates that the boat will be turned over to the Philippine Navy, but might be transferred later on either to the Philippine National Police - Special Boat Unit (Maritime Police), or to the Philippine Coast Guard, which are in need of additional assets.

It also remains to be seen what type of 7.62mm machine gun will be included in the delivery, considering that most Chinese machine guns of this caliber uses the same ammo as the Dragunovs, which is the 7.62 x 54R rimmed cartridge.

Based on our sourced documents, the patrol crafts are expected to be delivered by March 2018 although these Chinese could deliver them earlier if they deemed possible.




Type 69 RPG:

This is China's copy of the RPG-7 of the Soviet Union, and is also made by Norinco. It was first introduced in the 1970s, it is surprisingly still in production, probably for the export market, as China has moved on to newer models to replace the Type 69.

The Philippine Army won't have much problem in receiving these RPGs since it is close to the Bulgarian-made ATGLs that they are using, although it still remains to be seen if parts of the Type 69 and ATGLs are the same which will ease logistics and maintenance issues.

The ammunition for delivery are almost the same as to those already in use with the Philippine Army's ATGLs. MaxDefense sources confirmed that the Army has already expended thousands of RPG rounds in Marawi City alone, and the arrival of additional ammunition is a welcome addition as the emergency procurement of several thousands of RPG rounds remain hanging until now.

Based on our sourced documents, the Type 69 RPG as well as the ammunition are expected to be delivered on or before December 2017. Considering that there were already announcements of an impending delivery this August, it is expected that these will be among them, together with the low light sniper rifle sights which are intended for delivery by August 2017.

The Norinco Type 69 Rocket Propelled Grenade, which is a Chinese copy of the Soviet RPG-7.
Photo taken from SinoDefence.com

Where are the Others?

With the list above, some may ask, where are the force protection equipment, sniper rifles, and drones that were among those proposed earlier.

It appears that the focus was made on the delivery of 3,000 CQ-A5 carbines, which MaxDefense believes was not actually part of the original proposal. But this was inserted to fulfill requirements for the Philippine National Police, considering that none of the AFP's service branches requested for rifles, and it is not logical to have another rifle type considering the widespread use of the Remington R4A3.

Also, the 5,000,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45mm munitions for the CQ-A5 carbines were originally not part of the request either. MaxDefense believes that the ammunition alone may have used up to Php160 million of the fund, while the CQ-A5 carbines were reported to be worth Php210 million.

So MaxDefense believes that the funds intended for more sniper rifles, force protection equipment, and small drones may have been taken for the delivery of the carbines and its ammunition instead.

It remains to be seen if the Philippine government will further request assistance from China. Honestly speaking, MaxDefense believes it would be better if the Philippines will request aid int eh form of construction equipment from China for use by the military instead of weapons. 

MaxDefense also believes that its best for the Philippines NOT to pursue the use of the US$500 million loan offer from China, considering that many in the AFP still prefer to source their weapons from other countries instead of China. Also, Chinese loans are very notorious for having very high interests as seen in the loans provided by China to several other countries.

MaxDefense will be monitoring the delivery of these Chinese aid, considering that the earliest arrival might be within this month.

Read More

Armed Forces of the Philippines Receives First Shipment of Defense Aid from China

The Armed Forces of the Philippines finally received the first shipment of arms from the People's Republic of China, as promised by the Chinese government to Philippine Pres. Rodrigo Duterte during his engagements with them, and highlighted by his two visits he made to China in 2016 during his State Visit, and in 2017 during his attendance to the One Belt One Road Initiative meeting.

The Norinco CS/LR4 7.62x51mm Sniper Rifle. MaxDefense believes the AFP received 30 units from this shipment.
Photo taken and from Raffy Tima's Twitter page.

Pres. Duterte receives the Chinese donation of arms and ammo himself during ceremonies at Clark Air Base.
Photo taken from PTV4's FB page. Photo by Eunice Samonte.

Background:

With the blooming friendship between the China and the Philippines spearheaded by Pres. Duterte's foreign policies, the president was able to secure a US$14.4 million military assistance grant from the Chinese government, and also a possible credit line worth US$500 million to acquire Chinese-made arms and materiel.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines was requested to submit a wish list of items they are interested to procure from China, as well as what they would want to include in the military assistance grant. So far, reports these past few months were sketchy but the general consensus are for the acquisition of small arms and sniper rifles, corner shot weapons, fast boats, night vision systems, unmanned aerial systems, and bomb disposal equipment. Looking at this list, ot appears to be closer to materiel used in Internal Security Operations, considering that the main thrust of the Duterte administration is on fighting drug related crime and terrorism.

But on May 2017, Defense Sec  Delfin Lorenzana mentioned that the deliveries will include 4 fast boats, 200 sniper rifles, and several hundred Rocket Propelled Grenades with ammunition. No mention was made on all other items listed earlier.

So far no exact figures has been determined, except for the fast boat which was said to be four (4) units.


First Tranche of Arms:

The first shipment of donated arms to the AFP arrived at Clark Air Base in Pampanga on 28th June 2016, onboard four Ilyushin Il-76 transport planes of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). According to the introduction made by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Eduardo Año, the distribution of the    v are, and I quote, "3,000 units of M4-type assault rifles with more than 5 million ammunition, and 90 units of sniper rifles with more than 800,000 ammunitions".

Crates of rifles and ammunition being prepared before the ceremony of acceptance.
Photo taken from Inquirer.net 

Based on photos and information released during the acceptance ceremonies yesterday, it appears that the rifles received are the Norinco CQ-A5 assault rifle, Norinco Type 85 semi automatic marksman rifles, and Norinco CS/LR4 bolt action sniper rifles, with associated ammunition.

The Norinco CQ-A. The AFP received the CQ-A5 variant.
Photo taken from the Small Arms Defense Journal.

The Norinco CQ-A is a Chinese copy of the C M4A1 5.56mm carbine of the US. While the AFP is very familiar with the M4, being a longtime user of the Colt M4 and M4A1 variants with special units, and having the Remington R4A3 as its new standard rifle for all Army and Marine units, the AFP is not very familiar with the CQ-A despite a lot of similarities with the M4. The AFP received the CQ-A5 variant.

The Norinco CS/LR4 rifle, also known as NSG-1.
Photo taken from Modernfirearms.net.

The CS/LR4 bolt action sniper rifle is a modern design from Norinco which chambered to 7.62mmx51 NATO. It is said to have a 1 minute of angle (1MOA) accuracy within 300 meters and has a maximum effective range of 800 meters. lt is equivalent to the Remington M24 Sniper Weapon System that snipers of the AFP are currently using.

The Norinco Type 85, a copy of the Soviet SVD Dragunov sniper rifle.

The Type 85 semi-automatic marksman / sniper rifle is a Chinese copy of the Soviet/Russian SVD-63 Dragunov 7.62x54mmR rifle but is said to be reverse-engineered to perform better than the original Soviet model.

Originally it is chambered on 7.62x54mmR round, but Norinco also produced a version chambered to 7.62x51mm NATO, similar to those used by the AFP. But based on the product info posted during the turnover ceremonies, it was described to be "7.62x54mm", as shown on the photo below. Thus these rifles are using ammunition that the AFP does not have in its inventory. It is highly possble then that most of the 800,000 7.62mm ammunition provided by China could be for the Type 85 marksman rifles.

The Type 85 rifles are labeled as chambered for 7.62x54mm, a round which is unavailable in AFP inventory.
Photo credited and taken from Eunice Samonte's FB page.

Sniper Rifle Quantities:

While the CSAFP already mentioned that there are 3,000 CQ-A rifles, we determine how CS/LR4 and Type 85 rifles are there, which was totalled as 90 units.

Each crate carries 5 sets of Type 85 rifles as shown on the photo below. this means that they could have arrived in 5s.

Each crate has 5 Type 85 marksman rifles and associated accessories inside.
Photo taken from PTV4's FB page, by Eunice Samonte.

Meanwhile, each CS/LR4 rifle is encased in a kit box as shown on the photo below.

The CS/LR4 sniper rifle comes in a hard carry-on box with all associated accessories inside.
Photo taken frm PTV4's FB page, photo by Eunice Samonte

This hard carry-on box kit is enclosed individually in a cardboard box, as shown on the photo below.

The Norinco CS/LR4 sniper rifle.
Photo taken from PTV4's FB page, photo by Eunice Samonte.

Based on one of the photos of below, it shows that there are at least 9 or 10 columns of brown cardboard boxes during the acceptance ceremonies:

10 columns of 3 boxes high is equivalent to 30 boxes. Thus China may have delivered 30 CS/LR4 sniper rifles.
Photo taken from PTV4's FB page, photo by Eunice Samonte.

If there are 30 CS/LR4 sniper rifles, then there are 60 other rifles out of 90, which could be the quantity of the Type 85 marksman rifles delivered to the AFP.

While there are only 90 rifles chambered in 7.62x51mm, China delivered more than 800,000 rounds! MaxDefense believes that these rounds are not just for these 90 rifles, but could also be to help the AFP in their requirements for more 7.62x51mm NATO rounds which is being used regularly by snipers and marksmen of the AFP. MaxDefense also believes that the AFP could be expecting more marksman and sniper rifles from China, as promised by the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines.


Who Decided on the Choices of Weapons?

It is rather surprising that China sent in 3,000 CQ-A5 rifles for the AFP when there is a consensus in the military that these copies of the M4 are inferior to those already in use by the AFP, specifically the M4, M4A1 and the R4A3. It is highly unlikely that the Philippine Army or any other service branch requested for these CQ-A5s as the lack of new assault rifles to replace the venerable M16 is already being addressed, and it is more logical to acquire more R4A3 rifles from Remington, or even M16/M4 byproducts from the Government Arsenal.

Samples of the rifles to be shown to Pres. Duterte just before the ceremonies.
Photo taken from Pia Ranada's Twitter page 

Meanwhile, it is a different case for marksman and sniper rifles. There currently is a strong need for new marksman rifles for the AFP as the current model used by regular infantry units, the old M14 rifle, are rapidly deteriorating and are already performing less than hoped for at most times. The delivery of 60 Type 85 Dragunovs are a welcome for our marksmen, but honestly it is insufficient in number. The same is true for the sniper rifle requirements of special operations and regular infantry units, they are in need of more sniper rifles, and 30 of the CS/LR4 is also insufficient despite being a welcome addition.

Thus, it is worth asking if the AFP was the one who specified the items for delivery or if it was a Chinese decision based on their point of view of the requirements?

MaxDefense believes that if the AFP was the one who made the choices, they could have asked for more of the Type 85s and CS/LR4 rifles rather than getting 3,000 CQ-A assault rifles.


Marketing Plan:

With the AFP actively in need of new rifles to replace the M16 and M14, and more sniper rifles to increase its capabilities, the arrival of these Norinco products allows their testing by the AFP in combat operations to see if they live up to expectations in terms of accuracy, dependability, consistency and build quality. There is a strong consensus in the Philippines that Chinese arms are inferior, something the China would be happy to disprove, if they can.

It also is a gamble for China to allow a pro-Western military likethe AFP to test their products in real world situations, as it they would be comparing it to the usual Western-sourced arms that they have been using for decades. But should these Chinese products perform well, it gives Chinese arms manufacturers like Norinco a chance to entice the AFP to buy more Chinese products in the future considering Norinco not only manufacture small arms but also armored vehicles and even missile systems.


Benefits for China:

Symbolisms are also high in this deal.

In a period when major powers are contributing in the fight against the growing ISIS threat, China has so far been less active with almost no troops on the ground nor any deployments to help fight the ISIS in the Middle East.

The idea that Chinese weapons are used to fight ISIS terrorists could be used as good publicity for the Chinese government. Imagine photos of their weapons in action and used by Philippine forces could bid China well in political standing and can be used as propaganda to the Chinese general public back home.

This show by China that they can try to match America's military assistance (who recently just provided weapons and equipment to the Philippine Marines Special Operations Group) which also allows China to put more pressure on the Philippine government (and to the pro-US armed forces as well) to reduce dependence on the US and keep the Philippines at bay while the territorial issues in the West Philippine Sea remains unsettled.

Will China be able to gain influence within the Philippine military just like what the US has? MaxDefense believes it will take time for such to happen. If the next presidential administration goes back to being closer to the US than China, then it might not even happen at all in the near future. But its still a big question if the Philippines' good  and growing relationship with China continues after Duterte. But definitely this is a start of it.

A People's Liberation Army Air Force Ilyushin Il-76 together with P-3 Orions from the US Navy and the Royal Australian Air Forcr in Clark Air Base. who would have thought that this could even happen.
Photo taken and credited to Raffy Tima.

Despite all these, a military assistance is still an assistance that is gratefully accepted by the country, in the same way any assistance fromany other country is accepted with gratitude.

Read More

On Japan's entry into the West PH Sea disputes, China's apprehensions, and what it meant for the Philippines

MaxDefense is again pleased to have a good friend, eminent defense analyst and historian Prof. Jose Antonio A. Custodio, share his piece here in our blog pages, this time discussing historical background of Japan's militaristic past, its past conflicts with China and the rest of Asia, and why Japan's foray into the territorial issues in the West Philippine Sea could likely make China more concerned and furious against its longtime regional nemesis. 

Posting the entirety of the 3-part series altogether in a single entry, first published in Interaksyon.com starting last July 16, 2015. Photos were added by MaxDefense according to its own interpretation of Prof. Custodio's article. 

Japanese and Philippine warships in a joint naval exercise in the West Philippine Sea in 2015. More exercises between the 2 strategic partners are expected, with the strengthening of bilateral economic, defense, and political relations between the Philippines and Japan.
Photo taken from the Japan Ministry of Defense.

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Part 1: Japan in WPS: Beyond China evoking World War II atrocities:

Japan’s entry into the West Philippine Sea has been fully supported by the Philippines and vigorously protested by China. This action by Tokyo has revived memories of the Second World War as Beijing has been using the records of Japan’s transgressions and atrocities during the previous global conflict as propaganda to counter Japanese security initiatives in the region.

The Philippines, which ironically had been a country occupied by Imperial Japan, is now rapidly finding itself marching in step with what may turn into its strongest ally after the United States should anything formally be drawn up between Manila and Tokyo. It has also used the World War II past but not against the Japanese but against Beijing.

Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III had stated that China has been acting very much in the same manner that Germany had been treating its neighbors in the 1930s leading to the outbreak of war in Europe. Oversensitive Chinese took exception to this declaration by the Philippine president overlooking the fact that what was compared was the similarity in the bullying tactics and unilateral actions of Germany with what China has been doing for the past decade and it was never alleged or claimed that the Chinese ruling elite were a bunch of murderous genocidal maniacs which the Nazis were.

Despite of course the fact that Beijing is systematically destroying Tibetan culture and Maoist tenets do have a tinge of genocidal tendencies itself as seen in the massive deaths caused by the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s.

The thing is, while everyone is harking back to the Second World War to warn about what either China and Japan are doing, one of the most essential factors that led to the outbreak of war here in Asia in 1941 seems to be overlooked especially by the Chinese.



China and Japan: It’s personal

For centuries, both China and Japan have been at each other’s throats.

In many instances the Korean Peninsula had been the real estate where the two squared off against each other.

However following the reclusive Tokugawa Shogunate, the newly modernized Japan fought and pulverized the armies of the decaying Manchu Dynasty and won the 1895 Sino Japanese War. The next decades would see Japan carve out territory after territory at the expense of China.

In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and in the next decade firmly established itself in Manchuria. This made war inevitable and it broke out after being instigated by Japan in 1937.

The brutality of that war has left a lasting impression on the Chinese and atrocities like the Nanking Massacre, the Burn All-Kill All-Loot All anti-guerrilla punitive operations by the Japanese and the notorious Unit 731 chemical and biological weapon experiments have never been forgotten.

A photo said to be taken during the Nanking Massacre (aka. Rape of Nanking) during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Although the event is now being questioned for its authenticity and accuracy, whatever the real numbers are, China still holds grudges against Japan for its humiliation and defeat by Japan.
Photo taken from topsecretwriters website. 

Following the war, Japan really did drag its feet in acknowledging and apologizing for its atrocities and it is indeed true that for every effort by Japan to extend remorse for its wartime past, there was an attempt within the country to justify the reasons why Japan went to war.

That obviously did not sit well with many Asian countries, most especially the Chinese. Those are the reasons why it had become personal between the two countries.



The trigger of World War II in Asia

As mentioned, Japan had been deeply involved in China following the undeclared Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and even much earlier than that, and the bulk of the Imperial Japanese Army was deployed in operations against the Chinese.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was also involved in the war with its warships and aircraft effectively conducting a blockade of China by seizing strategic ports and locations along the coast. Although the war was localized it was sending a chilling effect on the rest of the region and the Europeans and Americans took steps to ensure that its interests in Shanghai and Hong Kong were safe from any spillover from the conflict.

In June 1940 when the Germans vanquished the French, the Japanese sensed that France’s colonial possessions were ripe for the picking. After browbeating the Vichy French authorities to accept Japanese military presence in Indochina, Tokyo then began establishing bases in that French colony. Simultaneously, the Japanese entered into the notorious Tripartite Agreement with Rome and Berlin and became a member of the Axis alliance. These two actions were the straws that practically broke the camel’s back for Washington and London. Economic sanctions were immediately called for by the Americans against the Japanese. The British together with the Western European governments in exile supported that US initiative and a crippling economic blockade of strategic materials such as rubber, metals, and most especially of oil was imposed on the Japanese.

As Japan had no such resources, this embargo would have a devastating effect on Tokyo’s national interests. Japan’s war leaders were now in a dilemma. Should they buckle under the pressure of the Americans and Europeans and cease their operations in China and lose face in the process, or should they continue with the war and run out of the means to conduct it?

For quite some time, the Japanese high command was undergoing a debate as to which front to expand next as there were those who favored concentrating against the Soviet Union while others cast covetous eyes on the rich possessions of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia. Following a series of defeats against the Soviet Union at Mongolia in the late 1930s, and the pressures and demands of the war in China, the focus shifted towards the colonies at Southeast Asia. Now with the US led embargo in full effect against Japan, the capacity for the Japanese military to conduct operations was measured in several months before oil and other essentials run out. The plan then was to strike southwards and conquer the rich colonies there. The trigger then that started the war for Japan was the reality of being starved to submission by the economic embargo.

The US embargo of critical war materials in 1940 brought almost brought Japan to its knees, and made it realize that it needs to strike fast and capture alternative sources of resources and control of trade routes. If China keeps control of the West Philippine Sea based on its so-called historical claim, Japan might be brought back to the same condition. History shows that Japan won't hesitate to act fast if this happens to her.

Part 2: The strength of Japan: the second type of island-nation mentality:

There are two types of island nations. The first is the type that, because of its isolation brought about by the seas surrounding it, tends to look inward and have little or no comprehension of external developments. The second is the type that seeks to go beyond the seas that confine it and in the process build large empires whether by conquest or economic activity.

Japan is the latter type of island nation and is very similar to the United Kingdom in that regard. The Japanese view the sea lanes as fundamental for their national survival as commerce, vital to the viability of their economic life, and depend on its unhampered flow into and out of Japan. No ifs or buts about that.

Hence, China as a nation located in the Asian mainland may have difficulty in understanding that very fundamental aspect of Japan’s existence as a powerful maritime nation state, which had already caused it to go to war 70 years ago. Simply put, one cannot mess around with Japan’s contact with the outside world and get away with it.

While postwar Japan strove to learn the lessons of the Second World War by embracing peaceful economic development, it also created a powerful naval capability that would check the Soviet Union’s submarine force during the Cold War - this, in order to avoid a repeat of its disastrous experience when the United States strangled the Japanese through prewar economic sanctions and the wartime naval and submarine blockade.

In fact, former officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy joined the newly established Japan Self Defense Force ensuring that lessons learned during the war years would remain codified in the new military organization. One such individual was Minoru Genda, the officer who planned the air assault on Pearl Harbor. After the war, he joined the Japan Air Self Defense Force and became its commanding general from 1959-1962.

Even with its purely defensive policy, Japan maintained a large, modern, well equipped and well trained naval and coast guard forces to safeguard their trade lifelines, exclusive economic zones, and be ready to project power if needed. That is expected to increase further now that Japan has allowed its self defense forces to act like a normal armed forces.

On the other hand, these very lessons of the Second World War seem to have been forgotten by China in its haste to establish suzerainty over this part of the world; and it seems to have not properly assessed the Japanese response to what it is doing in the West Philippine Sea.

Many observers and analysts fail to realize that Japan is a nation composed of several large island groups that has a deep and historical appreciation of the maritime domain and its role in the country’s survival and viability as a powerful and influential state. This has been a recurring theme in Japan’s history from the 19th Century onwards, and felt very keenly by the Japanese during the Second World War. Just like Great Britain which 19th Century Japan looked up to as a model worth emulating, the Japanese first attempted to establish a traditional empire that ended with the disaster of the Second World War; and, following that, an economic empire: both attempts required a strong maritime tradition and capability to protect and advance their interests.

However, by the tailend of the Cold War, Japan could already see the handwriting on the wall regarding United States presence in the Asia Pacific, and since the late 1980s it began modernizing its power projection capabilities.

The first indicator of that was the appearance of a new type of vessel in the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, the LST 4001 Osumi in 1995. Although the Japanese made great effort to explain the ship as a Landing Ship, it somewhat resembled a small aircraft carrier with its flat deck and island superstructure. Japan built three vessels of this type.

The JDS Osumi, a landing ship tank with a flat deck, of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). Japan has 3 of this type of vessel in its inventory and are considered as LST.
Photo from seaforces.org.

In the early 1990s, the Japanese military was already participating in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and this, too, was another indicator of Japan’s increasing shift toward projection of forces as such activities familiarized Japan with operations outside of the Home Islands and in the logistic needs for such.

The last time the Japanese had projected their forces was in 1945 and there was a lot of catching up to do.

By the 21st Century, Japanese combat aircraft were being deployed further and further away in exercises with their American ally in the Pacific region. Then in 2006, the Japan began the construction of DDH 181 Hyuga.

Hyuga on the day of its launch was the biggest warship in the JMSDF; although it looked like an aircraft carrier and approaching the size of a World War 2 era fleet carrier, it was designated as a destroyer. This then made it the largest destroyer in the world at 646 feet in length, and Japan built two and named the later one DDH 182 Ise.

The JDS Hyuga, which was described by the Japanese as a helicopter destroyer. But it closely resemble a helicopter carrier. The JMSDF has 2 of these ships.
Photo taken from seaforces.org.

The names Hyuga and Ise were once carried by two battleships of the Imperial Japanese Navy that entered service in World War I and saw extensive combat in World War II and were both modified as hybrid battleship/aircraft carriers.

DDH181 and DDH 182, however, both lost the distinction of being the largest “destroyers” afloat when Japan commissioned the DDH 183 Izumo in 2015 that, again, despite it being designated as such, had all the appearances of an aircraft carrier. At 814 feet in length, it is also as large or if not larger than many World War II-era fleet carriers, thus making it theoretically possible to operate fixed-wing aircraft if modified with a ski jump and with the flight deck reinforced.

Although Japan is part of the consortium that is developing the Lockheed F-35 Lighting II and has agreed to order 42 of the F-35A variant, should it opt in the future for the B variant - which is the Vertical and Short Take Off model - then it will really raise suspicions about the true intention of all these flat decks in service with the JMSDF.

The JDS Izumo, currently Japan's largest warship, which closely resemble an aircraft carrier and is even larger than some fleet carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy of the past. Technically, the JMSDF has 3 aircraft carriers as of now, and is building another Izumo-class ship.

What the reefs represent for Japan:

When China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that swallowed up the East China Sea, Japan was one of the countries that vigorously protested. Each time Beijing did a provocative action, the Japanese did not flinch from facing off with them.

Today, Chinese incursions into Japanese airspace have so become a regular occurrence that the Japan Air Self Defense Force maintains a round-the-clock alert status in areas the Chinese aircraft regularly intrude into. China - no longer Russia - is effectively the number one violator of Japan’s airspace.

Now that China has undertaken an artificial island construction spree at the West Philippine Sea - something only the most naïve or the most treasonous will view as anything but military outposts designed to curtail and control movement into the area and to project Chinese military power - the impact of this to Japan is not something that is hard to guess, as all these lie astride Japanese shipping.

Of course, the Japanese are aware of the Chinese First and Second Island Chain strategy, but it is doubtful that they will wait for that to transpire before they take any action.

The illustration above shows the crude oil trade flows in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea as of 2011. All crude oil from the Persian Gulf, Africa and other countries west of Japan passes through the disputed waters. A Chinese control on these waters could be devastating for the Japanese , thus their interest in keeping the area check from Chinese domination.
Photo taken from the US Energy Information Administration.

Part 3: Why China is apprehensive about Japan's entry into the West Philippine Sea:

In 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe led a Cabinet decision to lift Japan’s restrictions on the use of force overseas. This is the concept of collective self-defense which although being challenged by the political opposition is being used as a means to eventually redraw the Japanese Constitution. The collective self-defense concept contains three conditions which are as follows:

The first is in a case where a nation with close ties to Japan comes under attack and the lives, freedom, and right of Japanese nationals to pursue happiness are clearly endangered. The second condition specifies that force may be used only if there is no other effective way to protect the lives of Japanese citizens. The final condition is the limitation of the use of force to the minimally required level. These standards open up the way for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, under certain conditions, to aid an allied nation that is under attack, even if Japan itself is not.

Since then the Japanese have ramped up not only their government to government contacts with the countries in dispute with China in the West Philippine Sea, but they are also working to become a regular and strong presence in the area. Consider that the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force has conducted two exercises with the Philippine military within the month while at the same time it is widely reported that a maritime patrol aircraft will be provided to the Philippines by Japan.

A Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges was signed between the two countries on January 2015 which set the stage for Japanese activities with their Filipino counterparts that ranges from exercises to assistance programs. By June of 2015, the maritime agencies and navies of the two countries had undertaken two joint exercises which underlie the rapid manner in which the defense and security relationship between Tokyo and Manila is developing.

Just to put emphasis, prior to those two exercises, there was practically no activity between the two militaries. The last one between the two was in 1945, and both the Filipinos and Japanese were trying to kill each other! In fact, it can be said that Japan’s current activities in the Philippines have the potential to approach the level of the security relationship that Manila has with Washington DC.



The Japanese mindset: not a puppet of the Americans:

Conventional thinking has it that the Japanese are a cog in the grand plans of the United States in the region and that Japan is a puppet of the US. That would be an oversimplification of the relationship between the two countries and disregards the fact that Japan, just like the Philippines and Vietnam, is a frontline state against China’s territorial ambitions and considers the situation a clear and present danger and a direct threat to its survival.

That situation then creates the favorable climate upon which the lessons of history and the historical experience of Japan will come to play.

Many analysts tend to view Japan’s posture as either the effect of ultranationalism or as being subordinate to Washington DC, as if the survival of Japan is only the preserve and concern of so called ultranationalists and puppets of the US. It definitely is not.

Ultranationalism or unabashed pro-Americanism will not spur the construction of aircraft carrier type ships in the JMSDF, and it would also not be the driver for Japan’s reaching out to countries in the region to establish a coordinated multinational effort to face China.

Given the experience of Japan during World War II, it is safe to assume that the destructive air and naval blockade that the United States imposed on the Home Islands during that conflict would leave an indelible mark in the minds of generations of Japanese national security policy makers and military planners.

These people are the architects responsible for building and reorienting the Japanese military through the past decades to its current state, which is now benefiting the current term of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and is allowing the Japanese government the capability to respond decisively to China’s ambitions now and in the years to come.

With that traumatic historical experience at the back of their minds, and the fact also Japan is a frontline state, it may just turn out to be more forceful than the US in asserting its agenda and interests in the region especially when it comes to facing off against China.

China’s achieving its strategic goals as becoming the dominant power in the region will not sit well with Japan as it will result in it becoming a subordinate state to Beijing. That will not be in the national interest of Japan.

Thus Japan will most likely push back against China with or without US support as it not only has the economic capability to stand up to pressure from Washington DC should the leadership there become less sympathetic to Tokyo, but it also has the military capability to do unilateral actions. Which is probably why Chinese political and military officials are very apprehensive of Japan’s entry into the West Philippine Sea.

Hence it will be in Japan’s interests that countries like the Philippines that are sympathetic to it or have common issues against China be made capable of spreading Chinese capabilities thin so as to cause Beijing to limit itself to occupying a few artificial islands and nothing anymore grander than that as a reminder of its folly of trying to take on so many opponents at once.

What China has to realize is that it has stirred up a hornet’s nest in its actions against Japan. Although China has used history by raising Japan’s atrocities during and before the Second World War as a means to drive a wedge between Tokyo and countries that had once felt the boot of Japanese imperialism, what it forgets is that in modern and contemporary history, the Japanese have never lost a war against the Chinese.

China cannot claim to have won the war against Japan during World War II when it was ultimately Russian forces that destroyed the Japanese Kwantung Army in China. That fact provides a very strong psychological boost for the Japanese against the Chinese.

Contrast that with the defeatism and feeling of inferiority so prevalent among many Filipinos when it comes to dealing with China as a regional power.

Although considered as one of the strongest bilateral partnerships, the Japanese would not allow the Americans to be completely in control, and has started distancing itself from the policies the Americans implemented as part of Japanese defeat in World War 2. Push comes to shove, with or without American support, Japan would assert itself against China using its own capacity.

What now Philippines?

Although it is an oft repeated statement that each country is guided by its own national interests, the question that needs to be asked is if the Philippines truly understands the undercurrents that shape Japanese strategic perceptions and objectives.

Does Manila really understand how far the Japanese will go to defend their interests and that throughout history the Japanese - when they feel besieged - have the ability to strike out without warning against an enemy?

Consider that in the span of a few decades, Japan has carefully built up its power projection capabilities and modified its security outlook to engage and defeat threats way before they reach Japanese shores. That in a span of a few years, from a strict assistance program limited to aid to the Philippine Coast Guard and others of a civilian nature, Japan is now emerging as a potential provider of military assistance to Manila.

The Philippines has to realize that it is not dealing with a dithering easily distracted ally like the United States of America, but a country that has a suppressed martial tradition that may just reappear due to China’s rapacious territorial ambitions.

Philippine Navy frigate BRP Ramon Alcaraz (left) and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force destroyer JDS Hatakaze during KAKADU 2014 exercises off Australia.
Photo taken from Australian Navy.

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Empowering the Philippine claims in the West Philippine Sea - An Analysis from a WPS Expert

MaxDefense is borrowing an analysis made by one of the Philippines' foremost defense and security analyst, Prof. Jose Antonio Custodio, who has extensive knowledge on the dispute of the Philippines with China in the West Philippine Sea and along the so-called "10-dash line". This analysis was earlier posted as a special with TV5's Interaksyon.com last week (May 25 to 27, 2015). As this analysis would be better kept for re-reading and record for a longer period of time, it was decided to post the entire article (3 part series) in the MaxDefense blogs rather than just posted on the MaxDefense @ Facebook page.

This discusses the current situation in the West Philippine Sea, debunks the assumption made by Philippine politicians and policymakers, and provide an attainable and practical solution for the Philippine government without being too much dependent on a singular proposal in nature. Many, including those with military and political experience and knowledge, think that China, a military and economic powerhouse, is an invincible force that would be impossible to counter or stop from doing whatever it wants in the West Philippine Sea, including stumping without regard on the historical and lawful backgrounds of its fellow claimants, and the emphasis on peace, stability, and rule of law by the world's major powers. MaxDefense and Prof. Custodio thinks otherwise, and here is the full script of the entire post.

(Special thanks to Prof. Jose Antonio Custodio for allowing MaxDefense to make this possible. Photos, and the words underneath them, are provided by MaxDefense, and does not in any way represent Prof. Custodio's own views.)

Photos taken by a Philippine Air Force patrol aircraft as of February 19, 2015 shows the reclamation works done by the Chinese in the Spratlys.
Photo taken from Inquirer.net.

PART 1 -  WHAT'S NEXT IN DISPUTE WITH CHINA? Let's start with assessment of current situation:

The massive construction and reclamation activities being done by the People’s Republic of China at the West Philippine Sea have caused widespread concern in the international community.

The Philippine government has seen fit to elevate the threat of Chinese territorial ambitions as the most serious one affecting the country which is a clear break of the nearly half a century prioritization of internal security concerns by the Philippine defense establishment. There has been a slow but steady move to refocus the Armed Forces of the Philippines away from internal security towards external defense in the past few years. It is hoped that eventually this will provide the Philippines the capability to deal with external threats much more effectively.

Although the Philippine government has filed a case against the Chinese government, it is obviously not enough to prevent Beijing from continuing its expansion into the West Philippine Sea and complementary actions have to be done by Manila to defend its territorial claims in the area and its Western Exclusive Economic Zone.

A look at the maps provides a clearer picture as to the threat posed by China’s reclamation and base building activities in the West Philippine Sea. 



Reclamation not only directed at PH
Although there has been much debate in the Philippines about the reason for the construction and reclamation of the Chinese with one side stating that it is Beijing’s retaliation for the arbitration case and the other side contesting that assertion, the scope of their activities reveals that it is not only directed against the Philippines but at the much more comprehensive installations established by the Vietnamese in the same area.

Hence once these Chinese bases become fully operational, it will not just make life more difficult for the Philippines but also pose a clear threat to Vietnam’s own garrisons.

In fact, in comparison to Vietnam’s installations, those of the Philippines have remained rudimentary in nature and will not require excessive pressure from the Chinese to dislodge and would not seem to justify Beijing’s expenditure of resources.

Once China neutralizes the installations of its rivals at the West Philippine Sea, what role in area denial will these new bases of theirs play?

These then raises the question as to who else are these reclamation activities by Beijing directed against and obviously the ultimate target is not just the Philippines, nor Vietnam but eventually the United States of America.

Chinese reclamation at South Johnson Reef, also known as Mabini Reef, which is part of the Kalayaan Group of Islands in the West Philippine Sea.
Photo from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

PH garrisons for dropping of international case?
For the Philippines, it will be hard-pressed to deal with the increased operational tempo of Chinese vessels and aircraft operating from the new installations and if it does not improve on its capability soon then a nightmare scenario will ensue.

This may in the future, result in the elimination of most of the Philippine installations from the West Philippine Sea either through Chinese actions or voluntarily by Manila itself or the Chinese may allow the Filipino garrisons to stay in exchange for onerous terms advantageous to Beijing such as the exploitation of our EEZ, the dropping of all cases filed in international courts and even unrestricted passage of Chinese military vessels through our internal waters and airspace towards the Pacific Ocean to challenge the Americans.



Threat at Scarborough Shoal
While focus has been maintained on the Chinese reclamation at the West Philippine Sea, Beijing reactivated another front against Manila by undertaking aggressive actions against Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal which had been seized from the Philippines in 2012.

What is disturbing about Scarborough Shoal is that it lies 138 miles from Zambales, Luzon and it is very near Philippine centers of gravity such as the capital city of Manila and the political and economic complex of Central Luzon, National Capital Region, and the Southern Luzon and the major ports and airports at Manila, Subic, and Clark.

From there, the Chinese can easily interdict and harass Philippine lines of communication and movement.

Although China denies that it will develop the shoal as a military installation, given Beijing’s penchant for doublespeak, it would be foolish to not consider such a possibility in the near future because the shoal provides the Chinese the best possible opportunity to bottle up not just Philippine air and maritime assets but also to monitor, contain and restrict United States military movements.

Philippine lawmakers and soldiers placing a Philippine flag on the exposed portion of the Scarborough Shoal years before the Chinese Coast Guard took permanent position around it since 2012.

PART 2 - IS CHINA INVINCIBLE? Debunking Philippine assumptions on the territorial dispute:
Manila has consistently resorted to diplomatic protests against Beijing’s unilateral actions and frequently shies away from direct confrontation with Chinese maritime vessels at the West Philippine Sea.

Oftentimes, Filipino fishermen are left to their own devices in confrontations with Chinese maritime vessels as there is no escort provided by the Philippine Coast Guard.

The question then is why is the Philippine response conducted in such a manner? The following Philippine assumptions in the territorial dispute are the reasons that explain that response:

1. China is strong and US is weak:

It is a widespread belief in the Philippines that China is a rising power and the tendency is to overstate the capabilities of China either due to ignorance or to pro-Beijing advocacies. 

China's economic strength is trumpeted as a sign that it will overtake the United States which because of prolonged economic troubles is then automatically designated a weakening power.

The fact that the Chinese government strives to provide positive data to project its strength while taking steps to cover up or suppress not so flattering data that some economists have pointed out as serious flaws in China’s economy is frequently overlooked in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, the economic problems of the United States has been added to a litany of perceived grievances by Filipinos on American reliability as an ally thus making the Philippines question the military alliance that it has with the US instead of figuring out ways to derive opportunities for the Philippines. Unfortunately, the Philippines in general has a very black and white appreciation of the alliance it has with the US.

An example of this is the recent US willingness to deploy ships to monitor the establishment of Chinese bases at the West Philippine Sea has boosted the morale of the Philippines however it must be determined as to what exactly will be the mission of these American vessels.

It would not be wise to assume that the United States suddenly took up the cudgels for the Philippines as it is not expected that the US will accost Chinese ships or physically prevent the continuation of construction at the reefs.

They are there to remind the Chinese not to threaten the flow of global commerce and not to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone or ADIZ at the WPS. It is doubtful that they are there to protect the EEZ of the Philippines nor to escort Filipino fishermen.


Filipino fishermen and the EEZ will continue to remain vulnerable to Chinese depredation. The danger is that it is raising expectations so high in the Philippines and if the US fails to deliver from the point of view of what Filipinos expect, a new round of recriminations will ensue.

Chinese naval destroyers during a military exercise. Although China has become stronger than ever, it does not necessarily mean the US has become weak just because of their delayed movement and decisions in the WPS issue.

Overstreched Chinese military capabilities:
In the case of China, the Philippines does have a tendency to excessively exaggerate Chinese capabilities without a realistic assessment and an understanding of the environment. Filipinos tend to bean-count when it comes to Chinese capabilities and strength and look at it from a strict Philippines against China framework. The fact that China is facing multiple opponents is seldom taken into consideration or if ever is quickly dismissed with the statement that “Beijing will buy them off eventually.”

Aside from the Philippines, China has territorial disputes with three major regional powers and these are Japan, India, and Vietnam. The navies and maritime capabilities of both Japan and India are individually superior in many aspects to that of the Chinese.

Although China did make much noise about the launch of its aircraft carrier, in contrast, the Indian Navy has been operating carriers for half a century while the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force has commissioned at least three ships they euphemistically call destroyers but are almost similar to light aircraft carriers.

In fact the most recent ship to be commissioned, the Izumo is as big as the carriers of the Second World War Imperial Japanese Navy.

Furthermore, the important thing to remember is China’s military modernization is in transition and in absorption of new military hardware whereas its rivals are already advanced not just in the possession of equipment but also in the operational uses of such.

Also, China’s aggressive moves has resulted in its assets experiencing overstretch as it has to deal with neighbors who have been angered by Beijing’s brazen activities.

In the case of Vietnam, the Philippines seems to fail to recognize that despite the Vietnamese being very confrontational with China and figuring in many incidents since the 1970s and most importantly having no tangible military alliance with a superpower, Beijing cannot impose its will with finality on Hanoi’s scattered outposts in the West Philippine Sea.

That then is an indication of Beijing’s weakness which should be clear for all to see but unfortunately the Philippines has become accustomed to the habit of scaring itself witless in the face of China and is averse to taking on the Chinese physically in defense of its territorial integrity.

The Philippines is not the only country China is in a disagreement with, there are bigger and powerful regional countries like Japan (above) and India who are also in the game, that are probably bent in containing China's aggressiveness in the region.

2. China is too powerful while the Philippines is too weak:

There are other limitations to the Philippine’s appreciation of China’s ambitions despite overwhelming evidence that points to a much grander geopolitical objective. One of the fallacies entertained by the Philippine side is that the Chinese are only after economic resources in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea and nothing else.

The First and Second Island Chain strategy of China, the establishment of obviously military installations at the West Philippine Sea by Beijing, and even the blatant implementation of an Air Defense Identification Zone at the area in all aspects but in name only as seen in the harassment of a Philippine Air Force airplane and recently a US Navy reconnaissance aircraft by Chinese installations and vessels all cannot seem to convince quite a number of public figures and even academics that the objective is more than just fishes and energy resources.

It is true that aside from the hundreds of warships in the Chinese Navy, there are also approximately more than 400 China Marine Surveillance vessels that implement Beijing’s territorial ambitions in the West Philippine Sea and elsewhere.

Against this huge Chinese armada, the Philippines can only commit several dozen ships of varying capabilities and hence the belief that the country is weak and can never overtake or even face off against China is firmly engrained in the minds of many Filipinos.

What again Filipinos fail to realize is that these Chinese assets are also deployed elsewhere especially against the formidable Japanese and redoubtable Vietnamese and not even mentioning the goliath that is the United States Navy.

China has obviously bit off more than it can chew and is obviously trying to bluff its way into a de facto situation favorable to it in the West Philippine Sea which no other nation is buying into except unfortunately the Philippines which remains consistently mortified of Beijing.

The Philippine military might be weak, but with proper decisions, support, and commitments by the government to improve its condition and provide what it needs, it would still be possible to make it a force to be reckoned with even by a regional power like China.
Photo by the US Navy, taken from Wikipedia.

3. A fixation on the military solution when coast guard can be used instead
There seems to be an overemphasis by the Philippines on facing the challenge posed by China through a military solution and because of the sorry state of the Armed Forces of the Philippines it results in two situations.

The first is that the modernization of the armed forces especially the navy and the air force will take at least 10 years and even then it is not a guarantee that modern military capabilities will be used in a confrontation with China because the political leadership can just decide not to provoke the Chinese out of fear.

The second is because the military is taking too long to modernize and the belief is that it is the crucial lynchpin upon which all else lies, the tendency then is not to actively engage the Chinese because the country is defenseless.

It really has not sunk it that one of the most effective ways of frustrating the Chinese is through the use of the coast guard as the primary instrument. Just looking at the way Vietnam and Japan block Chinese incursions through the use of low-tech coast guard vessels that given their nature do not raise the ante to high as to warrant the use of military force should provide a guide as to how to deal with China in the WPS.

Furthermore, not unless the Philippine defense establishment has modified its defense strategy for the Philippines, the concept of defense in depth at the West Philippine Sea that first appeared during the modernization discussions in the 1990s and sometimes appears in current discussions on strategy has always been rendered moot and academic by the insertion of Chinese installations behind and in between Philippine installations.

The Philippine government must make use of its Coast Guard to avoid giving the Chinese a reason to use their navy against our forces. All the coast guard needs is more attention and funding for it to be able to acquire the skills, men, structure, and equipment that it needs.

PART 3 - BEYONG DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS: A proposed approach on territorial dispute with China

Scarborough Shoal more than Ayungin should have been the line in the sand for the Philippines vis a vis China. Now that it is gone, great effort must be taken that the Philippines should not take one more step backward as it has been prone to do in the past. To do that, the Philippines must undertake a combination of actions that will aim to stop China in its tracks in the West Philippine Sea aside from the arbitration case and the diplomatic offensive.

Aside from the raising international awareness through its current diplomatic offensive, the Philippines should ensure that appropriate steps are done to take advantage of China's territorial disputes with many of its neighbors by establishing coordination and support among the maritime and naval agencies of countries such as Japan, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia - aside from the United States.

This will then not just be the task of diplomats but also of the entire Philippine government including Congress, the Department of National Defense, and the AFP.

There is a need to project to China the message that other countries are not just committed but also coordinating in a multilateral effort to squash Beijing's ambitions. As it is Beijing's desire to drive a wedge between countries in the region either through bribery or intimidation then it is important not just to establish a multilateral diplomatic effort but more importantly a working multilateral maritime effort that does not necessarily have to be within existing frameworks of multilateral engagements such as ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum.


Overstretch China
Multinational patrols and coordinated actions are one sure way of overstretching China's maritime and naval assets to the point that Beijing will run the risk of suffering the fate of the Soviet Union (when Moscow wasted its resources in catching up militarily to the United States in the 1980s) if it decides to try to pour additional funds to increase capabilities.

China can be frustrated through such an effort which is why this early it has already been trying to bluff its neighbors to deal with it bilaterally so it can divide and conquer.

Also for the Philippines, calling out allies for mobilizing support against China divides Beijing's attention and buys time for capability buildup whether in the Philippine Coast Guard or the Philippine Navy.

There must be added emphasis on the buildup of capabilities for the Philippine Coast Guard. Compared to the Philippine Navy and Philippine Air Force which have to go by modern military and technological standards in hardware acquisition, vessels for the PCG do not necessarily have to be state of the art.

All they need to be is be robustly constructed, have good communication equipment, equipped with non-lethal capabilities (i.e. water cannons), and large and strong enough to withstand being rammed by Chinese maritime vessels.

Above shows Japan Coast Guard and Philippine Coast Guard ships in a joint maritime exercises recently. If improved and combined in coordinated action with other friendly coast guards in the region, the PCG can become a major role player in maintaing peace and stability, and enforcing the Philippines' sovereign rights and laws over its territories and interests in the WPS.

PH ships, Filipino sailors
It is very much within the capabilities of Philippine shipyards to churn out several dozen of such low tech vessels within a year and there are enough personnel graduating from maritime schools looking for jobs who can man those ships.

The personnel advantage of the Philippines as a major supplier of seamen for international shipping and as a builder of sea vessels are being overlooked. Costs will be significantly lower compared to the modernization of the AFP and this will allow the Philippines to establish a presence in its EEZ (exclusive economic zone) quickly and cheaply.

Just as important is that not only will these vessels protect Filipino fishermen but they will also particiapte in the efforts to break through expected Chinese blockades of Philippine garrisons at the West Philippine Sea.

Alhough much effort is being put increating a monitoring capability for the Philippines but knowing is useless if there is no capability to challenge.

The role of the PCG is to cover the gaps and buy time as the Philippine military undergoes its protracted modernization that is has been trying to do so for the past 25 years since the Philippine Senate kicked out the US bases.

In this regard, it may be advisable to remove the PCG from the Department of Transportation and Communication that already has its hands full in the traffic and transportation situation of Metro Manila alone and turn it over to the Coastwatch Council which itself may be transformed into a Department for better focus in lieu of the heightened role of the PCG in the preservation of the country's territorial integrity.

The Philippines is a natural seafaring nation, a potential maritime power, with the men and knowledge as a backbone to support and attain this goal. All it needs to reach this is the support of the Filipino people and the government.

Turning the KIG installations into hedgehogs
The garrisons of the Philippines must be strengthened and their capacity to withstand protracted periods of Chinese blockades and harassment. Provisions must be stockpiled especially that of water and food.

If need be, defenses must also be improved. The issue of the survivability of Ayungin must be addressed and decisions must be made and carried out to improve the outpost there.

Most important of all is to look at Philippine garrisons as a threat to China and not to look at China’s garrisons as a threat to the Philippines.

In that manner, there will be ways upon which the strengthening of the capabilities and survivability of the garrisons can be done.

From turning them into monitoring posts with equipment sourced from friendly nations and to turning Pagasa with its Rancudo airfield and the other smaller installations into power projection bases for the PCG, PN, and PAF.

As China wants to cut the KIG garrisons off from the Philippines, these very garrisons which are in between Hainan and Beijing’s WPS installations can threaten China’s overextended links that stretch much longer and are more vulnerable to disruption.

The Philippine should improve its facilities, structures and defenses in the Kalayaan Group of Islands, and maintain them in top condition. This is the only way to keep its foothold on the remaining islands it holds.

A shift in Philippine attitude
Although the Philippines will and should commit great effort to win over more and more allies and take advantage of its defense alliance with the United States the primary responsibility for the defense of Philippine territory rests with the Philippines itself.

In the current pivot to Asia that the United States has announced, the Philippines must not raise its expectations too high as to what the Americans will do for the Philippines.

Even with Japan declaring that it will study the issue of using its forces abroad in situations that they will consider as a threat to their national security and the Indians also echoing the same thing, none of these nations will physically assist the Philippines if the Chinese continue to harass Filipino fishermen.

That responsibility rests with the Philippines alone and it is expected that the Chinese will continue to deny the Philippines the use of its own EEZ.

Hence, multinational efforts may derail China’s strategic ambitions for the 9-dash line and the 1st and 2nd island Chains but it will not prevent them from committing acts of mischief against Philippine interests in the WPS.

Furthermore, as the Philippines has for whatever reason, chosen to always remain doubtful of American reliability in the mutual defense treaty, the same guessing game also pervades the Chinese and they too have no idea what the US will do if China attempts to use military force against the Philippines and this can be used by Manila against Beijing.

Hence the Philippine side should not blink at China in its run-ins with that country at the West Philippine Sea. It must understand that China is still in no position to wage war and is bound to lose one given the strength just of the United States alone not to mention Japan and others deeply suspicious of Beijing.



China’s hubris

China is trying to bluff its way into the greatest theft of territory since the 1940s and Manila should call Beijing’s bluff.

Some years back, a senior Chinese officer boasted of a so called “cabbage strategy” that saw to the strengthening and gradual improvement of China’s garrisons in the WPS and the effective isolation and neutralization of those of the Philippines.

With regard to that, once the Philippines decides to call China’s bluff and takes a more active role in defending its territory and EEZ both unilaterally and in coordination with allies, Beijing will see its cabbages simmered and boiled in a stew of its own hubris.

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