Re-Offering the SBMS for Use Against Internal Security Threats as a Precision Land Attack Weapon

The new administration of Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, through his new Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, confirmed that the modernization efforts of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) will be continued despite earlier statements made by the new president regarding the government’s focus on the fight against internal security challenges, including insurgency and crime, instead of territorial defense. But also, the new defense secretary clarified that territorial defense won’t be given less priority as is actually among the priorities of the new administration.

Despite the confusion, the common denominator is that programs of the AFP Modernization Program’s Horizon 2 phase, which was originally slated to start by 2018 but might be advanced forward to 2017, will continue with minor tweaks on the acquisition plans depending on the urgency of needs from the AFP’s requirements.

Thus, the AFP is compelled to make adjustments to its procurement plans to justify their use for internal security challenges, while still making sure its relevance as an asset for territorial defense. Among those that MaxDefense believes the AFP can use effectively both for internal and external threats was the previously shelved Shore Based Missile System (SBMS), which is among those approved for acquisition under the Revised AFP Modernization Program Horizon 1 Phase.

The original SBMS as offered to the Philippine Army. It could be seen here that the system can also be used against ground troops. So it means it could also be used against Abu Sayyaf Group terrorists and other internal security threats as a better alternative to artillery and air strikes.
Photo from IMI.

The Shore Based Missile System: A Background:

MaxDefense previously discussed the Shore Based Missile System project, which was the most expensive project in the Philippine Army’s request under the Horizon 1 phase. It has an Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) worth Php 6.5 billion, and is to be procured by direct negotiation under a government-to-government (G2G) procurement deal with Israel and Israel Military Industries (IMI).

The original offer made by IMI involves the acquisition of a small battalion, with 2 batteries composed of 2 platoons per battery of mobile guided rocket / missile system that could be fired against threats from the sea, including ships, landing crafts, and even fixed positions on sea features. It also involves the acquisition of a battery of short-range air defense system that will defend the SBMS against aerial threats.

Each platoon will have its truck-mounted launchers and ammunition reload carrier/loader, radar, and platoon fire direction centre, while the battery has its own command post, FDC, support equipment, forward observation equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for surveillance and target acquisition.

The system is centred on IMI’s Lynx MLRS modular launch system, which is configured to fire different rocket and missile systems. To be able to hit small moving targets at sea, IMI has offered their 306mm EXTRA guided rocket which has a published range of 150 kilometres, and can carry several types of warheads up to 120 kilograms.

EXTRA is guided to its target by a GPS-augmented inertial navigation system developed by Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI). According to inside sources, the rocket adjusts its trajectory as the target’s position changes while in flight. This results to a circular error probable (CEP) of only 10 meters, although MaxDefense was informed that actual CEP is lower than published.

The project was already in the advanced stages when it was cancelled by then PhilippineArmy chief Lt. Gen. Hernando Iriberri for reasons explained in our previous blog entry. Instead, he proposed to use the Php 6.5 billion budget to frontload the acquisition of sniper rifles, force protection equipment, and other items for the Philippine Army that are originally scheduled for acquisition on the Horizon 2 phase. This proposal was ultimately not approved for implementation even until now. While the general said he didn’t cancel the project and just moved it to a later date, the project is still not implemented as of this writing.

Chile operates the IMI Lynx under a different name as it was said to be manufactured locally. The Lynx is the foremost launcher used for IMI's offer for the Shore Based Missile System (SBMS) project of the Philippine Army.

The SBMS was discussed previously in a MaxDefense blog, with the link below:

"The Philippine Army's Shore Based Missile System Project, and Issues on Re-Aligning its Budget for Other Projects" - dated July 4, 2015.

"SNAFU in the DND and the Philippine Army for Scrapping its Shore Based Missile System Project for Helmets and Vests" - dated July 9, 2015.

The IMI 303mm EXTRA guided rocket. This has a published range of 150 kilometers, and can hit naval targets as it could adjust its flight trajectory while in flight.
Photo from IMI's website.

The SBMS's Relevance in the AFP Modernization Program's Horizon 1 & 2 Phases:

The Philippine Army still has a requirement for the Shore Based Missile System (SBMS) under their Capability Upgrade Program's Horizon 2 phase which runs from 2018 to 2022. Based on this, they are looking to acquire at least 3 batteries of Shore Based Missile System, in addition to the initial requirements posted under the Horizon 1 phase which involved the acquisition of 2 batteries.

This CUP program still appears to be subject to changes depending on leadership, planning, requirement, and operational changes and needs. So it is still possible to revise the requirement depending on the situation.

This year until next year is still covered by the Horizon 1 phase, so technically we can only push for whatever is still left in this phase for implementation immediately.

The Duterte Presidency - Change Towards Internal Security Challenges:

With Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte becoming the new President of the Republic of the Philippines, he already mentioned that priority of his administration will beto resolve the internal security challenges, including the defeat of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) during his term. While his idea might be based on his experience as a mayor in Mindanao, or possibly due to either lack of information, lack of comprehensive understanding or briefing of the security challenges of the Philippines, or because of wrong information fed by people around him (see MaxDefense’s recent post on the Facebook page wall), the AFP is being limited in its acquisitions. But even so, it needs to push the limits to procure the necessary equipment it needs, whatever the call for attention is by the current administration.

It is still too early to say if the president is serious in his previous statements that external or territorial defense requirements will be given a backseat until he settles the internal security issues, but the AFP won’t be taking this easily and must act swiftly, smartly, and decisively.

Why Focus of SBMS?

MaxDefense chose to discuss the SBMS again because this project is among those already approved by the government for implementation, and was already previously allocated with funding based on the ABC previously requested by the DND and AFP, at Php 6.5 billion. 

With Horizon 1 already in its final years, the AFP should implement this project and not put the entire effort to waste. It's still not too late. Discontinuing the project will require the Army to return the budget back to the Department of Budget Management and it would be difficult to request for funding again next time. The AFP should also avoid the project from being overtaken by those included in the Horizon 2 phase that are still subject for funding and approval. MaxDefense believes that the SBMS, even in its current guise, is still relevant to the challenges that Pres. Duterte wanted to focus with, which will be discussed later on.

 

The CIDS is the basis of IMI's offer to the SBMS project of the Philippine Army, although IMI's offer did not include fixed launchers. The CIDS is already in service with the Vietnamese armed forces.
Photo from IMI's website.

Re-Offering and Re-Branding the SBMS and Meet New Requirements:

To answer the calls for equipment that are relevant and highly effective in ensuring the defeat of internal threats, MaxDefense believes that the SBMS, is still relevant for use not only against threats from the sea but also land targets.

To make it palatable to the current administration, MaxDefense proposes the re-branding of the project, moving away from the Shore Based Missile System name which focuses on territorial defense against naval threats. The name could be anything, as long as it sounds focused on internal security operations. MaxDefense proposes the name “Land Based Missile System (LBMS)” to describe the new system, for the sake of this discussion.

MaxDefense proposes that Israel’s SIBAT and IMI retain the system to be offered under the rebranded project. Everything will be the same: it still consists of the Lynx truck-mounted launcher system, and will still include the necessary support and logistics components like reloader, command posts, fire direction centre and radar systems, forward observation equipment, umanned aerial vehicles, and communications systems.

Ammunition will remain, using the 303mm EXTRA guided rocket optimized for use against ships or hard structures, while also considering the use of smaller guided rockets like IMI’s Accular, which is available in both 122mm and 160mm calibers for use against smaller and softer targets like formations, landing crafts, and soft structures. They could also open the option for the Philippine Army to acquire small cruise missiles that are compatible with the Lynx launching system, like the Delilah GL which not only has a longer range at 250 kilometres (published range) than the EXTRA, but can also pack a larger warhead, and has smarter capabilities like the ability to loiter for before homing to its target. This ability of loitering allows the missile to act as a surveillance system, or to allow the user to shift to a different target based on the data provided by the missile’s camera.

Also, allowing the Delilah to be incorporated to the system will allow the missile system to be true a “missile system”, which employs not only guided rockets, but actual land-attack cruise missiles.

 

The Delilah GL cruise missile can be an option for the Philippine Army to acquire later on as the Lynx can also launch them as an alternative to EXTRA, Accular, LAR-160 and Grad.

 

The Lynx can be seen here with a mix of Accular guided rocket launch pod (left) and Delilah GL cruise missile launch pod (right) mixed together.

The SBMS – Also an Accurate Land Attack Weapon:

Being a system that can be used to accurately hit naval and sea-based targets like moving ships and fixed structures on rocks or shoals, the SBMS (or LBMS) can also be used to hit land targets, be it fixed or mobile. This has been overlooked by many, even in the AFP, considering that there is not much difference on how the system works against land and sea targets.

Naval targets are actually more difficult to hit compared to land targets due to their nature of moving practically anywhere while in open sea, ability to detect incoming aerial threats and availability of hard and soft kill systems especially for surface combatants, and difficulty to provide target coordinates as there are only a few options to know where the ships are. Only aircraft, UAVs with surveillance and targeting capability, and long range search radars could provide information to set the munition’s course.

Meanwhile, ground targets are normally slow-moving or stationary, normally does not have detection and kill capabilities, and can be targeted by hidden forward observers close to the target, which can provide more accurate data to feed the launchers. MaxDefense also got clarification from Rafael Advance Systems that EXTRA and Accular does not need radar feed to provide target and guide the munition, as UAVs or forward observers would be good enough. If the system can effectively hit naval targets, no doubt it could do better against ground targets.

Considered as an artillery asset, the SBMS/LBMS can pound soft targets like insurgents hiding in the thick jungles, and hard fixed targets like encampments, pillboxes and defensive positions. It also means that the system can be used against more powerful land threats like enemy armoured, artillery, and infantry formations that successfully landed on the country’s shores.

Compared to conventional gun and rocket artillery, the guided rocket systems reduces the chances of collateral damage as it will be homing on the target accurately with pinpoint accuracy, and will be able to do so most of the time.  It also reduces the need for huge quantities of munition being launched at a certain coordinate since it only need one or few to hit a target. In the Philippine setting, this is important, as civilians and infrastructure are normally close to where terrorist groups hide or operate, and use of inaccurate artillery like 155mm or 105mm howitzers are dangerous and highly destructive without ensuring all destruction received by the intended target.

As an alternative to the larger EXTRA guided rocket, the PA could use the smaller, cheper Accular guided rocket which is effective enough for ground targets up to 40 kilometers from the launch unit.
Photo taken from IMI.

These are some of the projectile types that Lynx can launch, with the Delilah GL being a missile, the EXTRA and Accular are guided rockets, while the TCS, LAR-160 and GRAD and unguided field artillery rockets.
Photo taken from IMI website.

The SBMS/LBMS Launcher as a Multiple Launch Rocket System:

Aside from being a component of the SBMS/LBMS, the IMI's Lynx launching system can also be utilized by the Philippine Army for its Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) requirement, which is among those planned for acquisition under the Horizon 2 and 3 phases of the Philippine Army Capability Upgrade Program. For Horizon 2, the Army intends to acquire 3 batteries, with each battery probably consisting of around 6 mobile launchers.

As an MLRS, the Lynx can utilize standard 122mm GRAD with high explosive warhead, or the larger 160mm IMI LAR-160 Mk. IV artillery rockets, which can carry submunitions. A single standard Lynx truck-mounted launching system can carry two launch pod containers, with each container being to hold 20 122mm GRAD or 13 LAR-160 rockets. Larger 220mm Uragan unguided rockets can also be used by Lynx with only minimum adjustments needed, and up to 4 can be carried by a single launch pod container.

This capability is in addition to the use of guided rockets like EXTRA and Accular, and the Delilah GL cruise missile. Since each truck-mounted launcher can carry 2 launch pod container, the user has the option to mix and match the different rocket systems as necessary.

Azerbaijan operates the IMI Lynx as a MLRS platform, and it can be seen on the photo above that it carries the IMI EXTRA 303mm guided rockets (left), the LAR-160 160mm unguided rockets (middle) and the Soviet-era GRAD 122mm unguided rockets (right).
Photo taken from Military-Today.com.

Other Purposes of the System:

Another important acquisition that is included in this project is the presence of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in the equation. These UAVs are small, silent, and are designed to operate for up to 7 hours, and has enough range to reach more than the maximum range of the EXTRA guided rocket and loiter for target acquisition and post attack surveillance.

This means that not only are they useful for the SBMS/LBMS, but could also be used for surveillance missions on areas where suspected rebels are hiding or operating. Even without the need to launch the rockets/missiles, the UAV can provide information to ground commanders. It would allow for an unrelenting and continuous flow of information that will allow the AFP to operate continuous with relentless day and night operations that will surely tire the enemy into submission. 

Surveillance and targeting UAVs could provide accurate information day and night, and will provide the targeting information for the launching system. 

Approval Under the Duterte Administration?

MaxDefense believes that the Philippine Army's leadership is actually open to the product since a few years ago, and a proposal to return it back to the priority acquisition under the still unfinished Horizon 1 phase is expected to be accepted gladly for implementation.  

Being a weapon system that can be used both for internal and external security threats, MaxDefense believes that this project will have no problem getting re-approval for implementation, as long as it meets the same Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) as previously provided to avoid further complicating the project with delays to approve funding and adjustments.

MaxDefense sources confirmed that the system can be delivered quickly once a contract, letter of credit, and notice to proceed is provided to the supplier, Israel Military Industries. Additional orders under Horizon 2 will also be easy as the Israeli Ministry of Defense has been very active in pursuing the export of their homegrown defense products to the Philippines. So far they have been the fastest to react to the new challenges and changes in the government, and is expected to make headway in other expected projects too.

But its up to the people above the AFP, the ones that say if a project is good to go or not, if this project will proceed this time or not.Ultimately its still up to the people of the AFP and DND to justify the need for their projects before the agencies involved.

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SNAFU in the DND and the Philippine Army for Scrapping its Shore Based Missile System Project for Helmets and Vests

In its previous blog entry dated 4 July 2015, MaxDefense provided its analysis on the Philippine Army's Shore Based Missile System (SBMS), which was for acquisition as an anti-ship, anti-amphibious assault tactical ballistc guided rocket system. This is in the face of aggressive moves by China on Philippine territory, EEZ, and interests in the West Philippine Sea. It also discussed, based on initial news report by The Standard, the realignment of the project's budget to instead fund the acquisition of several infantry-related equipment for internal security operations.

IMI Lynx with EXTRA and LAR-160.
Photo taken from Jewsihbusinessnews.com

Previously MaxDefense concluded that either the Philippine Army proceed with the acquisition of the IMI's Coastal and Island Defense System (CIDS) for the Shore Based Missile System project, or if additional funding permits, revert to acquiring the more expensive but more capable anti-ship cruise missile based coastal defense system. MaxDefense also concluded then that considering the external threat the country faces, it would not be best to divert the funding for internal security operations related equipment.

The IMI Lynx self-propelled rocket/missile launcher system is an integral part of the Coastal and Island Defense System from IMI.

But just within this week, the earlier MaxDefense blog was overtaken by events and flooding of additional open information, thus the need to provide a new blog entry to further discuss the issue. We tried to conenct all the information already made available online and be as close as we can get to what probably happened.

To discuss in a more accurate manner, MaxDefense will divide this entry into several sections. You may also refer to our previous blog entry on this issue:

The Philippine Army's Shore Based Missile System Project, and Issues on Re-Aligning its Budget fo other Projects

BACKGROUND:

Additional Information on the SBMS Project:

Due to the sensitivity of the project, MaxDefense could only provide limited information.

The SBMS is based on Israel Military Industries' Coastal and Island Defense System (CIDS), with a project cost of  Php 6.5 billion (around US$144 million). 

A photo of the CIDS from IMI.
Photo taken from IMI's website.

The SBMS, as discussed in the previous MaxDefense blog, will be composed of the IMI Lynx self-propelled rocket/missile launching system, launching pods and ammunition, support systems including radar and fire control equipment, and other auxiliary vehicles. MaxDefense cannot disclose the exact figures for security reasons. 

Based on the reports quoting IMI's letter posted by The Inquirer, it might be possible that a limited air defense system to protect the SBMS is included in the deal, and was planned to be available in time before the APEC Summit starts this November 2015. MaxDefense is still confirming this assumption at the moment.

Projectiles that were supposed to be included in the deal are the EXTRA semi-ballistic guided rocket which can be used for moving and stationary naval or ground targets, and the LAR-160 free flight artillery rocket which can be used for land targets.

The EXTRA (EXTended Range Artillery) tactical ballistic missile, is smaller but similar in concept to the US-developed ATACMS, has a range of up to 150 kilometers, and can carry a 120 kilogram warhead that can either be high explosive, explosive fragmentation, or cargo for around 500 IMI Bantam submunitions. MaxDefense has not confirmed yet if the offer for the SBMS project includes submunitions which could be a problem as the Philippines' policy bans such weapons to be used. But its other warhead option, the explosive fragmentation, is effective against amphibious assault forces, damaging or destroying aircraft aboard aircraft carriers and flattop amphibious assault ships, or disabling radar, sensors, communications systems, and onboard helicopters aboard warhsips.

It appears that both the Accular guided rocket and the Delilah-GL small surface-to-surface cruise missile were not included in the deal due to cost issues, but can easily be integrated if acquired by the Philippine Army later on.

Including all support and security units, the entire system is good enough for an entire Army artillery battalion.

The IMI EXTRA tactical ballistic missile is the main projectile to be used against naval threats under the SBMS project. IMI claims that it can hit moving targets with a hit accruacy of up to 10 meters.
Photo taken from IMI's website.

Timeline of Events: 

As reference, MaxDefense connected the information already released by the press based on the following reports:

The Standard - PH plans to tap Israel for missile launchers (15 June 2013)

The Diplomat - Philippines Seeks Air Defense System From Israel (18 June 2013)

Interaksyon - Israeli firms show defense products to Army (30 July 2013)

The Standard - Missile System Pushed (01 July 2015)

Interaksyon - In face of China Threat, DND seeks to realign P6.5-B missile program back to internal security (07 July 2015)

The Inquirer - Military leaders 'axed missile deal for helmets' (07 July 2015)

The Inquirer - DND defends shelving of missile project (07 July 2015)

The Inquirer - Why DND put on hold P6.5B Israeli missiles (08 July 2015)

Some of these reports were also used for the remainder of this blog entry, although links were provided in green for further reference.

# # # # # # #


The SBMS project, together with other defense projects that have offers from Israel, had been in the negotiating table between the Philippines' Department of National Defense (DND), Israel Military Industries Ltd. (IMI), and the Israel's Ministry of Defense (IMoD) since 2012.

It was reported that on June 2013, the DND considered acquiring air defense and MLRS systems from Israel. It also indicated that Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and a DND delegation went to Israel to sign agreements with Israeli companies IMI and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. (Rafael)

On July 2013, Israeli companies composed of IMI, Rafael, Elbit Systems, and Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), displayed their wares and conducted product demonstrations to the AFP and DND officials at Fort Bonifacio. Among those listed in the report were MLRS, SAM, UAV, Night Fighting Systems, 155mm howtizers, and Command and Control equipment.

Going back to the SBMS, after 2 years of negotiations, the deal was reportedly finalized as a government-to-government acquisition only last 18 December 2014.

On February 2015, President Aquino approved in-principle some of the 28 projects under the RA 10349-covered Revised AFP Modernization Program (RAFPMP) worth Php60.143 billion. Although the SBMS was in the list, it was among those not approved in-principle due to comments made by the president. The president wanted the DND to check if the system does not violate the Convention of Cluster Munitions. As discussed by MaxDefense before, the IMI EXTRA guided rocket can actually be armed with submunitions if required.

By 05 March 2015, the DND submitted an approval request to Pres. Aquino for the PA's SBMS, together with 2 other projects for the PN. The endorsement was not signed for approval by the president for still unknown reasons.

But sometime on April 2015, the Philippine Army made a presentation to AFP and DND senior leaders, pointing out the need to move the acquisition of SBMS from 2015 to the next phase of the AFP Modernization due to emerging security threats against the terrorist groups Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Abu Sayaff (ASG). 

The discussion was later made formal by Lt. Gen. Hernando Iriberri, Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CGPA) with a submission to the Gen. Pio Catapang, Chief of Staff of the AFP (CSAFP) sometime on May 2015, recommending the items to be acquired in place of the SBMS. The following were among those listed:

Individual Weapons:

• 832 units of Designated Marksman Rifle (DMR) budgeted at Php149.760 million;
• 32 units Long Range Sniper Rifle budgeted at Php17.280 million

Force Protection Equipment:

• 39,889 units of Body Armor budgeted at Php1.356 billion;
• 81,449 units of Helmet budgeted at Php1.221 billion;

Tactical Radios:

• 150 units of 20W HF Manpack Radios budgeted at Php223.536 million;
• 3,185 units of 2-5W VHF Handheld Radios budgeted at Php678.060 million;

Other Equipment:

• 11,000 units of Night Fighting System budgeted at Php2.750 billion; 
• 2 Lots of Chemical, Biological, Radiation, and Nuclear (CBRN) Equipment budgeted at Php103.402 million;

All for a total allocated budget of Php 6.5 billion. 

Designated Marksman Rifles were among those requested for acquisition using the budget allocated for the SBMS Project. 

Also on May 2015 after the CGPA's letter was received, CSAFP submitted an endorsement letter to Defense Secretary (SecDef) Voltaire Gazmin closely based on CGPA's letter of recommendation. It also indicated that the SBMS will instead be included in the 2nd Horizon phase of the RAFPMP covering the years between 2018 to 2022.

On 10 June 2015, Sec. Gazmin presented the recommendation by the CSAFP to senior leaders of the DND and AFP, and approved it for endorsement to the President after strong lobbying by senior Philippine Army oficials, including the Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP who hails from the PA as well.

By 15 June 2015, Sec. Gazmin presented the revised request for approval of several internal security-related infantry equipment projects to Pres. Aquino. But he has some queries, and asked to check the Designated Marksman Rifle requirement again. Only an in-principle approval was provided pending answers to the president's clarifications. As of this writing, MaxDefense sources confirmed that the president has yet to sign the approval of the endorsement.

After 3 days, a letter from IMI dated 18 June 2015 was sent directly to Pres. Aquino, following-up on the Notice of Award and Contract and promising the partial delivery of the system before the APEC Summit, but without mentioning of the realignment issues.

If MaxDefense is correct, the first time this issue of realignment was brought out to the public was on 01 July 2015 in a report from The Standard (Manila Standard Today) which first mentioned the realignment issues. MaxDefense clarifies that it was not the one that started publicizing this issue as erroneously claimed by a certain forums.


THE ISSUES:

Status of Similar Projects as those Requested in the Realignment:

Even before the Philippine Army decided to shift the acquisitions away from the SBMS, the DND was already in the process of tendering or accepting delivery of several projects that are redundant to those the PA plan to acquire for Php 6.5 billion. Here are the following:

1. Force Protection Equipment: 
Currently the DND has an impending acquisition for 44,080 body armor for both the Philippine Army and Philippine Marine Corps. As logic dictates, it is expected that the Philippine Army will receive majority of the deliveries, probably around 38,000 to 39,000 units, as the PMC only has less than 10,000 men in its organization. Award of the project to Achidatex Nazareth Elite-Colorado Shipyard Joint Venture worth around Php1.4 billion was made on 28 July 2014. MaxDefense discussed this in a separate blog entry posted on 31 August 2014. It was expected that they will deliver their first shipment on 26 February 2015. But there were news reports saying that the first batch of 20,000 units has not arrived, even after being given a time extension until 29 June 2015. So far there was no press release from the DND to confirm if the contract with the joint venture was terminated.

Prior to this specific project, there was also an impending acquisition for 3,480 units of body armor worth Php120 million, which was awarded to Serbian company UM-Merkata DOO Sabac in 2012. Defense officials previously stated in interviews that the body armor were defective, although an arbitration case is currently ongoing to settle this issue. MaxDefense was informed that the body armor are still stored in an AFP warehouse and has not been issued to the troops.

So far there are no impending projects with the DND to acquire helmets for the Philippine Army.

Army troopers during the Zamboanga siege. Out of the 5 soliders in the photo, only 1 has a helmet, and none with body armor. MaxDefense believes that force protection equipment is important, but should be acquired properly.

2. Night Fighting Equipment:
There is also an impending tender to acquire 4,464 sets of Night Fighting Equipment worth Php1.116 billion for the Philippine Army. Bidding has yet to commence due to several reasons, but this project is bound to commence the tender process within this year. A separate MaxDefense blog entry dated 13 May 2015 has discussed this project, including the possible bidders as reported by the press.


3. Handheld and Manpack Radios:
The Philippine Army recently acquired several military-spec radios similar to those requested as part of the realignment. The project was covered by a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract with the US company Harris Corp. That particular acquisition project involved 60 units of 50W HF Radios and 1,446 units of 2-5W Handheld Radios.

The project status is currently on the delivery stage, and based on the previous performance of Harris Corp. in terms of meeting its delivery schedules, MaxDefense does not see any problem with them. Should the Philippine Army acquire more radios, it is expected that Harris will definitely get the deal under another FMS deal for system commonality.

Communication equipment from Harris Corp. is standard with the Philippine Army, and there is a need to acquire more. But it should be according to proper procedure.
Photo taken from CGPA 100 Days Magazine c/o Timawa forum.

Irregularities on the Realignment:

President Aquino clearly stated several times in the past, that as president of the republic, he supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines' shift from internal security operations to territorial defense to defend from an agressive powerful neighbor, and reported that the overall security situation of the country from internal threats are getting lower. MaxDefense believes that the president's claim is true, based on the reduced reports of fighting between the AFP and insurgent groups.

So why suddenly shift an major territorial defense equipment to acquire several items for internal security operations? In fairness to CGPA's reasons, it is not really a terrible decision to improve the equipment used by the troops on the ground to support their operations against terrorist and insurgents that continue to operate in the country. But it was a terrible decision to take the budget of an equally important project to fund his recommended projects

MaxDefense has several issues on this move by the defense establishment:


1. Failure to Follow the IRR of the Revised AFP Modernization Act:

As claimed by several reports, the entire process of realigning the project did not follow the standard procedure as prescribed by the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Revised AFP Modernization Act. These includes not allowing the revised project to pass through the Defense Capability Assesment and Planning Systems (DCAPS) and the Defense System of Management (DSOM), both are frameworks included under the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).

Recent press release by the DND claims that the revision did pass the DSOM process, considering the "consideration of the dynamics of the country's ever changing security environment". But based on MaxDefense's own analysis, with guidance from sources privy to DAS process, it is questionable on how it passed DSOM and DCAPS when the time between the submission of CGPA of the recommendation until the approval of the revision by the defense secretary only a month to complete?

According to sources, normally it takes several months, or even years, to create a plan for a certain defense project, including being assessed by military and defense officials, and even by consultants and specialists, passing through the DAS process, before being brought for endorsement for acquisition. But for this case, it took less than 1 month from the submission of recommendation by the CGPA to approval by the SecDef for not just 1, but 8 separate projects.

It is definitely questionable for the Philippine Army and DND to complete such assessment in such short time. If their claim is even possible, then we should have not been experiencing too much delays in planning the defense acquisitions of other projects.


2. Claims that the SBMS is "Merely a Proposal"

As stipulated in the DND press release dated 07 July 2015, they claim that the project is "merely a proposal" and has not moved beyond being a proposal. But MaxDefense has doubts on this as well.

The media reports indicate that the DND, IMI and IMoD took 2 years to negotiation this deal, and it was only considered finalized during the meeting between IMI and DND on 18 December 2014. IMI insists that the deal was finalized during that meeting.

This was again eveident on the letter from IMI to Pres. Aquino, wherein IMI commited during the negotiations that once an award is made, IMI would be able to start delivering and activating the system before the APEC Summit in November 2015. This, even if the delivery date is expected to be further after the president's term is over. MaxDefense believes that such a request was agreed upon by IMI because it possibly hold the DND's word that a Notice of Award (NOA) would be given soon.

The SBMS project was among the items being requested for approval with Pres. Aquino in its endorsement dated 05 March 2015. In-principle, the project was already approved, pending some queries of Pres. Aquino with regards to the cluster munition issue. The point that it was for approval means that the project was already finalized

Based on these reasons, the SBMS could not be just a mere proposal, but is an actual project ready for approval and award.


3. Acquiring Equipment that are Similar to Ongoing Projects:

Four of the replacement projects for the SBMS are actually similar and redundant to projects currently being implemented / for implementation for the Philippine Army, namely the Body Armor, Night Fighting System, and the 2 Radio-related projects.

Based on their own press releases, the Philippine Army has somewhere around 85,000 members. MaxDefense assumes that they currently have several thousand helmets and body armor already in inventory, probably with more helmets than body armor based on what is seen during operations of the Army covered by the press.

The current project awarded to Achidatex Nazareth Elite-Colorado Shipyard JV will cover around 36,000 (based on MaxDefense estimates) as the rest will go to the Philippine Marine Corps. Based on the list submitted by the Army, they are requesting to acquire 39,889 body armors and 81,449 helmets.

• As indicated in the press reports, their sources are questioning why all members of the Philippine Army need to have body armor and helmet? Not all PA soldiers are assigned in the field, do they need body armor as well? 
• Also, why is the requirement for helmet so huge at 81,449 pcs., and together with those already in army inventory, are more than enought to cover the entire organization membership! This is only acceptable if the PA is plannng to replace its helmet inventory. But the Army just bought thousands of helmets a few years ago, while it also received several thousand kevlar helmets as assistance by the US government in the past. Is there really a need to replace all helmets with a new one? 
• With 2 body armor acquisition projects still pending (from UM Merkata and Achidatex-Colorado JV), why is it not possible to settle these projects first, since these are already approved and awarded projects waiting to be completely delivered.

Should the Army decide to acquire additional body armor, it would best if they can allow Achidatex-Colorado JV to complete their contract first, so that future acquisitions could be determined based on commonality. If Achidatex-Colorado fails to complete their contract, then the 4th lowest calculated bidder, MKU Pvt. Ltd. of India, may have the chance of supplying the body armor (Achidatex-Colorado is the 3rd lowest calculated bidder after Kolon & UM Merkata DOO who were both disqualified). So it might probably take more time to determine who can really supply body armor to the Philippine Army.

The Philippine Army is scheduled to receive almost 40,000 new body armor from its "Force Protection Equipment" project with the Philippine Marine Corps. Would it not be better if the PA complete this project first before another similar project comes in?
Photo taken from Achidatex Nazareth Elite's website.

The same is true for the Night Fighting System. MaxDefense believes that it would be best for the DND complete the current NFS project for the Army, whose bidding has not yet even started, before another NFS project comes online.

An arguement pointed out by the media reports with regards to the NFS is on the required number needed by the PA. Currently the PA will acquire 4,464 sets, and MaxDefense assumes that there are also several more in PA's inventory. Adding 11,000 NFS for the PA would increase the total expected inventory to almost 17,000 sets, or a ratio of 1 NFS for every 5 soldier. It is up to experts in the field to determine if this ratio is too much or just enough, but arguements presented in media reports say that this is excessive.

The Philippine Army has an ongoing project to acquire 4,400+ sets of Night Fighting Equipment, similar to the systems installed on the rifle above. Why not let it finish first before another similar project is implemented?
Photo taken from UDMC's FB page.

As for the other acquisitions, MaxDefense believes that these are also needed equipment as they can be used not only for interal security operations but also for territorial defense. But why is it not possible to acquire these projects by requesting a separate project instead of using a budget of another equally important project?

If the Philippine Army believes that these 8 projects are very urgent and are really important, it would have been better if they requested special funding for them. But still, it has to follow the implementing rules and regulations of the Revised AFP Modernization Act like all other projects.

Rappler previously identified Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin as "the untouchable" due to his closeness to the president. If that's the case, why not let him use that strength into value by asking the president to consider the acquisition of infantry equipment using a new budget, instead of diverting funds from the SBMS project?
Photo taken from Rappler.

More Questions Raised than Answers on Shelving the SBMS?

The current stand of the PA and DND is that this was "following the ever changing dynamics of the country's security environment". But MaxDefense finds this reason too flimsy. Instead, there are more questions now raised on the PA's decision to shelve the SBMS project. Aside from MaxDefense's own questions, here are among the reasons that were posted by people in the social media:

• Following the reasons above, would it have been better if the Philippine Army gave importance to fund the delivery of 114 M113A2 armored personnel carriers granted by the US governement and still in California, USA to protect the troops from ambushes and IED attacks while on the move? Using armored vehicles while on the move instead of soft-skinned vehicles like army trucks and those Kia KM-450 is the best protection the Army can give to its troops, and until now this issue is still unresolved and the Philippine Army already holds the ball to have these armored vehicles delivered. Previously the reason used by the PA is lack of funding to have these vehicles delivered to the Philippines.
• Is body armor really the answer to save troops from IED blasts? MaxDefense believes it is not, since IEDs can even criple and destroy tanks and armored vehicles, so what more for soft human tissues covered with a little patch of armor in the head and body? They could have just been realistic by saying that the force protection equipment can protect the troops from enemy fire and reducing the risk of fatal wounds, rather than using IEDs as a reason.
• Is the security environment of the country changing? MaxDefense believes that it is changing, but was expecting it to be for the better, especially on internal security. According to earlier remarks made by Pres. Aquino himself, the AFP is shifting from being focused on internal security, to defending the country from external and natural (environmental) threats. So now, the PA and DND's plan is totally opposite of what the president claims.
• The Philippine Army has been experiencing IED attacks for decades, ever since the NPA and Moro rebels and terrorist groups started operating in the country. The only difference now is the technology used to detonate the IED, but the concept is still the same. So what's the difference now and before that suddenly needed the acquistion of all these protective equipment?
• The CGPA used the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) as among the reasons for the SBMS realignment. Was he giving the idea that the government is expcting the BBL to fail, and is expecting that Mindanao would go back to chaos once this agreement be scrapped? This is in total conflict with President Aquino's announcement of trust with the MILF and the so-called Bangsamoro people, who already declared that war is not an option even if BBL fails to take-off.
• The AFP has been declaring that the strength of the NPA is declining for several years now, and claimed that the IPSP Bayanihan strategy is working. So were they telling the public hoax information before, by proving that the NPA is still an effective force by acquiring more and better infantry equipment?
• Why is the SBMS project assigned with the Philippine Army in the first place, when it could have been better that the Philippine Navy took charge of this project as it was designed to defend the country against seaborne threats. This is a very clear scope of the Philippine Navy.
• Is the Philippine Army ready to shift from being an interal security branch of service into a force that could defend the country from external threats? Or being a country with no land borders with other countries has rendered the Philippine Army a force in waiting for a threat to come only after the Philippine Navy and Air Force are decimated in combat?
• CGPA Lt. Gen. Iriberri is from the Army. VCSAFP Lt. Gen. Bonafos is from the Army. CSAFP Gen. Catapang is from the Army. DefSec Gazmin was from the Army. All four agreed and approved of the realignment. Is there no love in the Army for fighting an enemy that can't be seen from the shore?

Aside from these questions, there are many more that you can see in the social media but are too delicate to discuss because of its negative view of the Philippine Army, the AFP, and the DND itself. MaxDefense decides not to raise them here for obvious reasons.

An Israeli Magach 7C main battle tank, showed here with a breached hull made by an exploding IED. So is it really possible for body armor and helment to protect the troops from IED explosions?

A Kia KM-450 utility vehicle ambushed by rebel groups, unarmored and unprotected from enemy fire, resulting to the death of Army soldiers. Is it not better if the Philippine Army acquire more armored vehicles, specifically MRAP or MRAP-like vehicles to protect its troops from IED or ambushes?

The Philippine Army is scheduled to receive 114 M113A2 armored personnel carriers from the US, but it has to shoulder the delivery to the Philippines. Isn't it better if the Philippine Army solve the issue of funding to bring in these assets first, which were designed to protect troops during movement and in combat?
Photo taken from the Mechanized Division Philippine Army website.

Other Possible Reasons for the Realignment:

Aside from the reason raised by the military and defense leaders as pointed out on the DND's press release, it is not farfetch that people can think of other reasons. MaxDefense thinks that these are possible as well.

• Is it possible that CGPA is getting back against the Philippines representative of IMI, Stone of David Corp., whose sister company, Joavi Philippines Corp. was responsible for filing a graft case against Lt. Gen. Iriberri with the ombudsman with regards to his shelving of 3 ammunition projects supplied by the said company? 
• Is the defense establishment unsatisfied with acquiring the IMI's CIDS system for the SBMS project, so they prefer to move it to the next phase and let the next leaders decide on it?
• Were people involved in the project dissatisfied that, with SBMS being a government-to-government deal, they are not able to get any kickback from the project?
• Did the defense officials found out something wrong with IMI's product, or with IMI itself, the led them to decide to more away from the deal without informing the public?

Joavi Philippines Corp. has filed a graft case against CGPA, Lt. Gen. Iriberri, in relation to shelving 3 ammunition projects supplied by the said company. The company is the sister company of Stone of David Corp., the Philippine representative of Israel Military Industries, who was chosen to supply the SBMS Project.
Photo taken from Joavi Philippines Corp. website.

CONCLUSION:

MaxDefense believes that overturning the decision to acquire the Shore Based Missile System without a comparable replacement to offer is a blow to the Philippines' bid to defend itself from external threats. Not 100% effective as it seems, the SBMS is currently the only weapons system that is moving, and that has a direct threat to enemy forces operating within the country's naval domain. Not only is the SBMS a physical weapon, but it is also a sign that the Philippines is serious in defending its claims and territorial intergrity against foreign aggression, and that is serious in shifting its priorities to territorial defense. It also gives confidence to Filipino troops in the Kalayaan Group of Islands, giving them a sense of relief that there is something the military can use in face of an seaborne invasion on the islands.

MaxDefense also believes that replacing the project with infantry related weapons is not totally wrong, but should have been done properly, following the parameters of the Defense Acquisition System brought upon by the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Revised AFP Modernization Act. This was made to safeguard the defense acquisition process from irregularities, and should be implemented in accordance to the law.

It would have been best as well, that if the Army really needs these equipment, they should have instead requested for emergency funding instead of taking the budget out of an equally important project. If they are confident that their reason is strong enough, MaxDefense believes that the government can do some adjustments to fund the infantry equipment.

MaxDefense also believes that it would be better if the AFP and DND review again who should be responsible in handling the SBMS assets. Being a system that was designed to engage hostile forces from the sea, MaxDefense believes that it would be best to let the Philippine Navy, specifically the Philippine Marine Corps, have the SBMS project instead of the Philippine Army. The PMC and PN are both tasked to complement each other and has common interests in defending against seaborne threats. The PMC, being a land force as well, can make use of the artillery capability of the Lynx MLRS using the LAR-160 rockets aside from firing on enemy ships.

This sudden move by the Philippine Army and Department of National Defense has just turned into a mess that would probably become a magnet for investigation, be used by the groups and people who have their own vested interests against the current leadership and administration of Pres. Aquino. 

Even worse, the integrity and schedule of the entire AFP Modernization effort might be affected because of this. And with that inter-service rivalry still strong in the AFP, MaxDefense expects the men of the Philippine Navy and Philippine Air Force to curse their Army counterparts if that happens.

Who's happy in the end with all this crap? None other than China, who sees the disunity in the defense establishment of the country as music to their ears, and a weakness that they can take advantage of.

Compared to the Philippine Army, the Philippine Marine Corps has a greater stake in defending against naval threats. The Marines should be the one having the SBMS instead of the Philippine Army.
Photo taken from GMA News website.

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UPDATES:
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August 13, 2015:

As per DND's letter to both the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and Israel Military Industries (IMI), they have finally confirmed that the Shore-Based Missile System (SBMS) acquisition that was originally confirmed to Israel Military Industries (IMI) has been rescheduled to the Horizon 2 phase (covering 2018-2022) of the Revised AFP Modernization Program. In other words, the SBMS for Horizon 1 has indeed been cancelled. 

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