Philippine Navy's 2nd New Frigate to Conduct its First Steel Cutting Ceremonies

After a long break on discussions regarding the Philippine Navy's upcoming future frigates being built by Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) under the Frigate Acquisition Project (FAP) of the Horizon 1 phase of the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RAFPMP), there are some important updates on the construction works of the warships.

The scale models of the two future frigates of the Philippine Navy, as provided by HHI to PN.
Photos provided exclusively to MaxDefense by one of our contributor.

According to official documents from the Philippine Navy (PN) and Department of National Defense (DND), the 2nd frigate, called internally by HHI as hull P160, should be scheduled to have its First Steel Cutting Ceremony tomorrow, 17 September 2018 at HHH's shipyard in South Korea. That is if there are no changes and problems encountered by HHI, or if the DND does not request to move the date as defense officials are currently busy on the aftermath of Typhoon Ompong / Mangkhut which may affect their attendance. No word though on who will represent the Philippines although it is expected that officials from the DND and PN would be there. So far the update was given only very recently, so we expect that HHI may not have any problems, and if DND doesn'ask for a schedule change, there is no other reason for the ceremony to not push through on 17 September 2018 as planned.

Photo was taken during the 1st frigate P159's First Steel Cutting Ceremony held in HHI's Shipyard in South Korea last 01 May 2018. A similar event will happen on 17 September 2018 for the 2nd frigate P160.
Photo taken from BusinessKorea website.

Meanwhile, the 1st frigate which is internally called by HHI as P159, is sheduled to have its Keel Laying Ceremonies on 16 October 2018.

Last May 2018, MaxDefense mentioned in a wall post that the 2nd Frigate's First Steel Cutting Ceremony is scheduled on September 2018. This means HHI's construction of the 2nd frigate is on schedule, and may reflect on HHI's accomplishments on the 1st frigate, as the production line is dependent on the accomplishments on the construction of the 1st frigate P159.

The scale model of the PN's future frigate as provided by HHI to the Philippine Navy.
Photo shared exclusively to MaxDefense by one of our contributor.

So far MaxDefense received information that several of the blocks of the 1st frigate P159 are completed, while many more are almost done, or will be done by the time keep laying starts next month. PN reports that HHI is confident that HHI will meet the scheduled Keel Laying Ceremony by 18 October 2018.

MaxDefense will provide updates on the First Steel Cutting of P160, as we expect news to be coming out days after the event. The same is also true on the Keel Laying Ceremony of 2nd frigate P159 on October 2018.

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Comparing the Air/Surface Search Radar Options for the Philippine Navy's Future Frigate versus Technical Specifications

For the past 2 years since 2016, MaxDefense had been discussing the Frigate Acquisition Program for the Philippine Navy, including the fact that Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) submitted 2 options for the different subsystems of the frigates.

While the Combat Management System (CMS) was discussed too publicly to the point that it even became a nationwide issue, which we all know what happened next. MaxDefense also mentioned several times especially in our Facebook posts that the CMS issue is just the tip of the iceberg, as the CMS affects most of the important subsystems like the sensors and surveillance systems of the frigates.

Aside from the CMS, another subsystem where HHI submitted 2 options is the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR), which is the most important surveillance sensor of the frigates. MaxDefense will discuss about the ASSR in this blog entry.

The Airbus (now Hensoldt) TRS-3D, which is among the 2 options provided by HHI for the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR) requirement, and HHI's preferred choice.
Photo taken from Hensoldt's website.

The other option HHI submitted for the frigate's ASSR is the Thales Nederland NS100 series of 3D AESA naval radar, one of the latest naval radars in the market today.
Photo taken from Thales' website.

The Air/Surface Search Radar System:

The Philippine Navy released an initial version of the Technical Specifications prior to the 1st Stage Bidding of the Frigate held on 04 December 2013. MaxDefense was able to discuss it in a blog entry for the frigate:

"Philippine Navy Frigate Acquisition Project - An Anaysis of the 1st Stage Bidding Specifications" - dated 09 October 2013.


MaxDefense believes that the initial specs were too general and too basic, and shows total lack of understanding on the subsystem. It also separated the requirements for air search and surface search, despite current technology having a single radar system that covers both requirements.

This was later on replaced by a more specific Technical Specifications. Not only did it combined the air search and surface search requirements into a single system, but it increased the performance values too.

This new requirements was also discussed in a previous MaxDefense blog entry:

"The Philippine Navy's Frigate Acquisition Program Finally Moves in 2016! New Technical Specification Released And Tender Soon" - dated 07 February 2016



Below shows the Technical Specifications as of 2013 (left) and 2015 (right) for the Air/Surface Search Radar as shown on the Supplemental Bid Bulletin Nr. DND/PN-FAP-16-01 released on 02 February 2016. The same can be seen on Page 26 of the Statement of Compliance form as provided under Supplemental Bid Bulletin Nr. DND/PN-FAP-16-03 released on 17 February 2016.

This is the Technical Specifications for the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR) system. The left is the old specs used in the 1st Stage bidding, and the right one is the updated specs used in the 2nd (and final) Stage Bidding, which is the prevailing version of the technical specs. No additional capabilities were added later on.
Photo cropped from the SBB No. DND/PN-FAP-16-01 dated 2 February 2016.

Important Points of the ASSR Technical Specifications:

Among the most important points of the ASSR's Technnical Specs are as follows:

1. Instrumented Range - should be at least 100 nautical miles for air targets and 40 nautical miles for surface targets.

This means that the radar should, at its maximum capability in the best weather (clear) conditions, should be able to see air targets of any size 100 nautical miles away from the radar (or the ship in general), or a surface target of any size from 40 nautical miles away from the radar. Surface target could be anything in the sea surface or the ground surface. This the most common feature that is used to determine if a radar system is superior over the another system, although in reality this should not be the case.

Take note: Surface targets only require a smaller range as radars detection of surface targets is limited due to the Earth's curvature. Microwave beams travel in straight lines/path.

Converting to kilometers, 40 nautical miles = 74.08 kilometers, while 100 nautical miles = 185.2 kilometers.



2. Tracking Capacity - should be at least 750 tracks for air and surface tracks.

The radar should be able to detect and track (or see) at least 750 air and surface targets at any given time. This is very useful in areas with high volume of military and commercial sea and air traffic like the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea where large commercial and naval ships are mixed up with small fishing boats, plus a large volume of commercial airline flight routes mixed up with military aircraft. MaxDefense believes that 750 tracks is a decent capability considering most new surveillance radar systems can track more than that.


3. Detection Range - minimum of 200 meters up to a maximum of instrumented range 

This means that aside from the ASSR to be able to see naval and ground targets at 40 nautical miles away, and air targets at 100 nautical miles away from the ship, the ASSR should also be able to see such targets to as close as 200 meters away from the ship. Radar systems do not normally see any target very close to the transmitter itself (like a ship berthed side by side with the ship it is equipped), and detection can only be made from a certain distance.  Surprisingly, the 200 meter requirement is considered too much since most modern radars can have a minimum range of less than 100 meters.

4. Azimuth Coverage - 360 Degrees

This means that the radar's maximum detection coverage allows it to see targets in all directions, which also means that the radar antenna has the capacity to turn at 360 degrees to be able to do this. This is standard in today's radar technology although it is right to include it in the technical specs.


5. Transmitter - Solid State

Solid state refers to the technology used for the radar system to transmit microwave signals. It is the current technology used in radars, replacing the old Magnetron-based technology whose performance is not as good, is less reliable, requires more power to use, and is physically larger and heavier, among others.


6. The Radar is primarily used for air and surface surveillance and acquisition and must be capable of quickly detecting and accurately locating air and surface contacts, and detection of sea skimming missiles at a minimum altitude of 10 feet to allow fire control resources sufficient time to lock-on and engage

This is a specification forgotten by many other discussions online about the Frigate's ASSR. The desciption is actually divided into two parts. First is the description of the ASSR, while the second part (underlined) is the actual specification, which is for the ASSR to be able to detect sea-skimming missiles at a minimum altitude of 10 feet.



MaxDefense believes that despite these requirements in the technical specification, it still lack enough information that allows it to be more specific to what it really requires. Among them include the lack of requirement on the radar's detection chance of specific targets with a given Radar Cross Section in a certain environment model, or the maximum elevation azimuth coverage of the radar system, both of which are also very important requirements.

This photo above was cropped from the Computer Generated Image provided by Hyundai Heavy Industries (top) of what the Philippine Navy's future frigate may look like once completed. Surprisingly, the ASSR antenna is strikingly the same as the antenna of the Thales Nederland NS100. Anyone could compare the antenna profile since there are numerous online photos of what the antennas of TRS-3D and NS100 look like.
Photo taken from Hyundai Heavy Industries' website.

 The Options Submitted by Hyundai Heavy Industries:

During the Submission and Opening of Bid Envelopes (SOBE) for the Frigate Acquisition on 17 March 2016, only two bidders were declared to be able to proceed with the acquisition process. Among them was Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), which was declared the 2nd lowest bidder after Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) of India. HHI  submitted 2 options for the Air/Surface Search Radar Systems: The Thales Nederland NS100 series AESA radar system, and the Airbus TRS-3D series radar system.


While other defense pages condemn MaxDefense, saying that our posts and information are half lies and innuendos, long-time MaxDefense readers and community members know that those accusations are false made by biased groups with vested interests in criticizing MaxDefense. The photo below was cropped from the actual Makers List submitted by HHI and included in the FAP's Contract signed last October 24, 2016. It clearly shows that HHI did offer 2 options for the ASSR. MaxDefense believes that no other defense page

The above shows the options submitted by HHI for the Air/Surface Search Radar (ASSR), which are the TNL (Thales Nederland) NS100 and the Airbus TRS-3D. Confirmation was made to MaxDefense that the specific versions being offered were the NS106 and the TRS-3D Baseline D. It also shows that HHI did offer 2 options for the CMS, although there is only 1 option for the Navigation Radar. MaxDefense decided to blur the other items for now and focus more on the ASSR.
Photo cropped from the FAP Contract's Annex F.

MaxDefense was lucky enough to be among the few who got access to the actual submissions made by GRSE and HHI, which allowed us to discuss them thoroughly through the years fro 2016 until the present.

Thales Nederland NS106 is a derivative of the newly developed but already successful NS100 series of AESA naval radars, and was said to be the actual model HHI is offering from the series. It takes improved performance over the older Thales Smart-S Mk. 2 radar, and uses Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technology which is the latest technology in radar systems due to its ability to control beamed radio waves without the need to move the antenna, or require moving parts for the antenna.

The NS106 is a smaller version of the NS100, designed specifically for use on smaller warships from Offshore Patrol Vessels to small frigates. Its latest user is the Republic of Singapore Navy's Independence-class Littoral Missions Vessels.

The Thales Nederland NS100 series, which includes the NS106, uses AESA technology, and is among the latest naval radars in the market today. Despite being new, it is already in service with different navies.
Photo taken from Thales Nederland's website.

The latest user of the Thales Nederland NS100 (NS106) 3D AESA Radar is the Republic of Singapore Navy, installing them on the new Independence-class Littoral Missions Vessels. It would be noted that Singapore is among the most stringent in defense procurement, making sure that they get the best military technology to compensate for their lack of manpower.
Photo taken from Singapore's Ministry of Defence.

Meanwhile the Airbus (now Hensoldt) TRS-3D radar is in the global radar market for almost 15 years now, and is a proven product in use by several navies. It is actual a direct competitor of the Thales Smart-S Mk. 2, and uses the older pencil-beam technology, which is already being replaced in the market by the AESA technology. The TRS-3D is now marketed by the German company Hensoldt, which originated from Airbus' electronics business unit. The TRS-3D's latest user includes the US Coast Guard's Legend-class National Security Cutter.

MaxDefense received confirmation that the actual variant being offered by HHI is the current Baseline D variant, the same variant used by the USCG Legend-class NSC.

The latest version of Hensoldt's TRS-3D, the TRS-3D Baseline D, is being used by the US Coast Guard's Legend-class National Security Cutters. The Baseline D is said to be the one being offered by HHI to the PN, being the variant being produced by Hensoldt.
Credits to source of photo.

Philippine Navy's Technical Specifications versus the Radar's Specifications:

Now we compare if the two radars comply with the technical specifications for the Frigate Acquisition Program, based on publicly-available information.

Spec #1. Instrumented Range - should be at least 100 nautical miles (185 kilometres) for air targets and 40 nautical miles (74 kilometres) for surface targets.

Based on Thales Nederland's own product data sheet found in their website, the NS100 has a Maximum Instrumented Range of 280 kilometres, and a Maximum Range of 80 kilometres for surface targets. These are way beyond the 185 kilometres (air search) and 74 kilometres (surface search) required as per technical specs. 

And based on Hensoldt's own product data sheet also found in their website, the TRS-3D has a Maximum Instrumented Range of 200 kilometers, also beyond the requirement provided by the technical specs.

Based on this simple requirement, both the NS100 and TRS-3D comply with the technical specifications.

But based on information not released to the public by radar manufacturers, the TRS-3D has deficiencies due to the older technology it uses. 

It appears that the TRS-3D only has the capacity to meet this requirement is the 6s mode, which is an update time of every 6 seconds. The TRS-3D has a corresponding update time between 1 to 6 seconds (6s, 3.5s, 3s and 1s) with the 6s only meeting the maximum range requirements. This is due to the use of older Pencil-beam technology which requires the operator to choose from different search modes or patterns during operation. Example, there is a different mode and performance values when the radar is required to do horizon search against sea-skimming targets, and in conducting target acquisition, and in conducting volume search. In short, there is a compromise whenever the operator requires to use a different mode of operation while using the TRS-3D.

This is where an AESA-technology radar shows its value and better performance, as AESA radars do not require such compromise as it can perform all modes simultaneously. Meaning, it can do volume search, target acquisition, and horizon search on sea-skimming targets all at the same time.

Since the technical specifications does not indicate this requirement, the TRS-3D would actually be compliant with the PN's specs, although it is apparent here that the NS100 (and NS106) performs way better due to use of superior technology.

Spec #2. Tracking Capacity - should be at least 750 tracks for air and surface tracks.

Based on the same sources, the Thales Nederland NS100 has an air/surface track load of up to 1,000 tracks at a maximum, while Hensoldt TRS-3D only a maximum tracking capacity of more than 400 targets.

Given that manufacturers do not fully disclose the real maximum capabilities of their products, MaxDefense can assume it could be +5% to +10% more than the posted values. This gives the TRS-3D a theoretical maximum tracking capability at 440 to 450 targets.

Despite the use of a 10% allowance, it shows here than the Hensoldt TRS-3D does not meet the technical specifications for the frigates, while Thales Nederland NS100 can track twice more than the its competitor, and easily surpass the technical specifications by 25% more, thus the NS100 meets the technical specs easily.

Here alone, it is easy to say that Hensoldt TRS-3D should be disqualified from being used as the ASSR for the Philippine Navy's future frigates for failing to meet a technical specification requirement.

Spec #3. Detection Range - minimum of 200 meters up to a maximum of instrumented range 

Still based on the same sources as the other specs, the Thales Nederland NS100 has a minimum range of 15 meters, and a maximum range of 280 kilometres. Meaning, the NS100 exceeds the required minimum range, and also exceeds the required maximum range.

Meanwhile, the Hensoldt TRS-3D has a minimum range of 200 meters, which meets the requirement, while having a maximum range of 200 kilometers. Thus, the TRS-3D meets both the minimum and maximum range required by the technical specifications.

This is very important especially in law enforcement duties, since the radar is capable of detecting small boats very close to the frigate. While 200 meters is visible to the eye, it could be different during the night when darkness could work well for the approaching boat if their intention is unfavourable for the frigate. 

Spec #4. Azimuth Coverage - 360 Degrees

Based on both the product specification data sheets of both radar systems, the Thales Nederland NS100 and Hensoldt TRS-3D are both compliant with an azimuth coverage of 360 degrees.

Spec #5. Transmitter - Solid State

Both the Thales Nederland NS100 and Hensoldt TRS-3D uses Solid State transmitter technology, thus both are compliant with the solid state requirements.

Solid State transmitter technology is the latest in radar technology, replacing the Magnetron-based technology that has been used since the 1940s.
Photo taken from Toshiba's website.

Spec #6. Detection of sea skimming missiles at a minimum altitude of 10 feet to allow fire control resources sufficient time to lock-on and engage

This requirement is something that were not indicated in the product data sheets available online for both products. Thus requiring MaxDefense to use information that are not available to the public.

MaxDefense won't be too specific on the actual minimum altitude range that both radars can detect sea-skimming missiles due to obvious reasons. But MaxDefense confirms that both the NS100 and TRS-3D can detect a sea-skimming missile at a minimum altitude of 10 feet above the sea surface.

This requirement is important as most anti-ship missiles fly towards the ship by flying as close to the sea surface as possible. Between 15 to 10 feet above sea level is actually a typical elevation used by many anti-ship missiles when sea-skimming.

Modern anti-ship missiles usually approach targeted ships at very low altitude, usually less than 20 feet from the sea surface.
Photo taken from Lockheed Martin's website.

But this again would be something where superior technology creates a difference. The TRS-3D can do detection of sea-skimming targets only in the 1s mode with a maximum detection range of 11.3 nautical miles (20.9 kilometers). Meaning, if the radar is being used at other modes (3s, 3.5s or 6s), the TRS-3D cannot detect sea-skimming targets.

Meanwhile, the AESA technology of the NS100 allows it to operate in all aspects without the need to change modes of operation to do sea-skimming detection and volume search, thus the NS100 can detect sea-skimming targets at all times.

These performance figures are very important in today's battlefield to allow the ship's crews to react faster from threats, considering that anti-ship missiles are now travelling faster than ever.

Conclusion:

Based on the technical specifications, it appears that Thales Nederland NS100 meets all the requirements, and even exceeded them with ease. 

Meanwhile, while Hensoldt TRS-3D met certain requirements, it failed to meet Specification #2, thus it automatically means that the TRS-3D does not meet the technical specifications of the project.

It would have been better if HHI offered the Hensoldt's newer and more capable ASSR, the TRS-4D AESA naval radar, which, after MaxDefense's own assessment versus the technical specifications of the project, complies with all requirements. TRS-4D is actually the direct competitor of the NS100, and uses the same technology and evenly matches in every aspect of capability and technology. Too bad HHI prefer to go cheap rather than fair.

Now, since based on the arguments pointed out by the Department of National Defense and the current leadership of the Philippine Navy is that Hyundai Heavy Industries will be the one who has the sole right to choose the subsystems for the frigate, MaxDefense believes that HHI will definitely use the Hensoldt TRS-3D radar for the frigates.

Not only is the TRS-3D cheaper by almost US$400,000 per unit compared to the NS106, but TRS-3D is compatible with the Hanwha Systems Naval Shield ICMS, this is due to the TRS-3D being in the market for almost 2 decades now, whereas the NS106 is not compatible yet due to NS106 being a newer product that has never been matched together with the Naval Shield and is not in service with the Republic of Korea Navy.

This is the bottom part of HHI's Makers List which is attached to the contract and signed by HHI and PN TWG Legal Officer Maj. Dayao. While it says that HHI has the sole right for the final selection for subsystems, the equipment shall fulfil the owner's requirements in building specifications and other design & build aspects. Since TRS-3D does not meet certain technical specification requirements, legally it should not be used for the frigate. But is NS100/NS106 compatible with Hanwha Naval Shield ICMS?
Photo cropped from HHI's Makers List as attached to the FAP contract.

But all parties, the PN TIAC and PMT, the DND and DND-Defense Acquisition Office, and HHI should remember that the clause also says "as long as equipment/sensor shall fulfill the owner's requirements in building specifications and other design & build aspects". So if HHI insists in using the Hensoldt TRS-3D, they are breaching the Technical Specifications, and in effect, breaching the contract of the project.

With the PN's TIAC already signed last 23 March 2018 according to our sources from the DND and the PN, its only a matter of time when a formal document will be made signifying the final equipment fit-out of the frigates. And MaxDefense would be there to cover that.

  

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How Did Thales Became Involved in the Philippine Navy's Frigate Project in the First Place?

The Department of National Defense, specifically its head Defense Sec. Delfin Lorenzana, has admitted in his statement yesterday 20th December 2017, that the reason why he relieved Vice Admiral Ronald Joseph Mercado as the Philippine Navy's Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), was because VAdm. Mercado was in conflict with the Defense Department's orders to proceed with Hyundai Heavy Industry's insistence to use the Hanwha Systems Naval Shield Combat Management System for the Frigate Acquisition Project (FAP). There are many sources online but readers may refer on the clickable links HERE, HERE, and HERE.

It was stated in many reports, and in MaxDefense Philippines Facebook page posts that VAdm. Mercado was indeed in favour of using the Thales Nederland TACTICOS Combat Management System, which both the DND and Hyundai are not in favour to use.

But it was made to appear in reports that VAdm. Mercado was the only one insisting on the use of Thales TACTICOS.

But in the first place, how did Thales come into the picture of the Frigate Acquisition Project? Did Thales just suddenly came out of nowhere and became VAdm. Mercado's preferred supplier in an instant? Who brought in Thales in the first place?

MaxDefense would like to clarify this misrepresentation of the issue.

The photo above shows a 3D render of the Philippine Navy's Future Frigate as posted by Hyundai Heavy Industries in their website on October 2016. The additional captions were made by MaxDefense Philippines based on the information coming directly from HHI's bid submission on the FAP's 2nd Stage Bidding. Pitz Defense Analysis provided the labelling works on MaxDefense's behalf. This photo was posted in our blog entry dated October 24, 2016 when HHI and DND signed the contract for the FAP.
Original photo taken from Hyundai Heavy Industry's website. Thanks to Pitz Defense Analysis for the assistance.

First of all, Thales Nederland came into the picture because Hyundai Heavy Industries was the one who brought them into the project. Among those submitted by HHI during the 2nd Stage Submission and Opening of Bid Envelopes (SOBE) last December 2015 was a proposal to use a Thales combat management and sensor suite for the future PN frigates, as indicated in their Baseline Configuration List submission.

As MaxDefense discussed as early as October 2016 in the blog entry "Finally, the Contract Signing for 2 New Light Frigates between Philippine Navy and Hyundai Heavy Industries", MaxDefense already mentioned the subsystems approved by the Philippine Navy for the frigates, and it includes the Thales Nederland TACTICOS Combat Management System. The PN's FAP Technical Working Group (TWG) was the one who insisted the use of Thales TACTICOS. The list MaxDefense provided in that blog entry came directly from the Baseline Configuration List submitted by Hyundai last December 2015 to the DND's Bids and Awards Committee and did not just came out of nowhere.

For further reference, even India's Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) submitted a full Thales Nederland combat management and sensor suite which is more comprehensive than those submitted by Hyundai.

So it was not VAdm. Mercado nor the Philippine Navy who brought in Thales into the project. It was Hyundai. So why did Hyundai, and even GRSE, brought in Thales into the project?

That is because Thales' products were compliant to the project's Technical Specifications, which was confirmed by the PN's Technical Working Group for the Frigate Acquisition Project. So why did Hyundai offered Thales only to backtrack later on when the contract was already awarded to them? Is this a case of "Bait and Switch" which, as many in the defense industry know, the Koreans are very well known of doing?



Evidence can be seen below on the position paper submitted by the Philippine Navy to higher authorities showing that the PN FAP TWG "sustained its preference of TACTICOS" for a number of reasons, mostly because Hanwha Naval Shield did not meet the project's Technical Specifications. For the record, this position paper was made in early 2017 when the contract was already signed and the Critical Design Review (CDR) already happening (hense, the FAP PMT Chairman position and not TWG which only applies before project starts), and did not come from VAdm. Mercado, but MaxDefense will reveal further details soon.

Above is an excerpt from just one of the position papers submitted by the Philippine Navy's Frigate Acquisition Program Project Management Team (FAP PMT) on their sustainment on using Thales TACTICOS as the project's Combat Management System. Other reasons for the decision was blurred for now, but will be discussed in the future as it holds key information on why TACTICOS was being consistently pushed by the PN including former FOIC VAdm. Ronald Joseph Mercado.
Thanks to our sources outside the Philippine Navy for providing this important document. (YES, it came from a different source which will surprise everyone when we post it later on.)

VAdm. Mercado's insistence to use the Thales TACTICOS has basis, being the one chosen by the PN's Technical Working Group since 2016, and according to further position papers submitted by the PN's Techical Inspection and Acceptance Committee (TIAC) and Project Management Team (PMT) which succeeded the TWG after the project proceeded with the Critical Design Review last January 2017, shows that the PN did not deviate from its position and still continued to insist on the use of Thales TACTICOS CMS.

VAdm. Mercado's position has legal basis, and has complete black and white documentation. Any investigation on the issue can easily see these evidences if investigators just request for a copy from the Philippine Navy.

MaxDefense will discuss more about the issue in future blogs.

Also, may I take this opportunity to inform everyone that there is a fake MaxDefense Philippines Facebook page that copied the cover photo, profile photo, group name, and even the layout of our page. The difference with this fake group and the original one is that our membership is more than 82,000 people, while the fake one was at 14 people as of this noontime. It also comments on Facebook regarding the FOIC relieving and frigate issues with an opposite stand to ours.

Thank you for your continued support of MaxDefense in uncovering the truth.

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Was Former Navy Chief Really Delaying the Frigate Project? Here is Our Simplest Answer

With all the fuzz on the relief of Vice Admiral Roland Joseph Mercado as the Philippine Navy's Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), different reasons were floated out by the public and even by the media reports. But one thing is certain so far, all media reports agree that VAdm. Mercado was relieved because of his disagreement with the Department of National Defense with regards to certain systems of the future frigate. Specifically the Combat Management System (CMS).

While the CMS isn't the only issue of the future PN frigate, it is the most highlighted issue because it was the one whose conflict was in every black and white everytime the PN makes its position to the Defense Department, and to the Office of the President.

Some reports say that the reason for the relief was because VAdm. Mercado was favouring a French company, which MaxDefense understand as Thales, in supplying the Combat Management System, and was in conflict with the Defense Department who chose a Korean-made CMS, which MaxDefense understand is Hanwha Systems.

While the reason is partly true, there is a reason why the former Navy chief was in favour of using the CMS from Thales, which MaxDefense named before as the Thales TACTICOS BL2.

First of, Thales TACTICOS was the original offer made by Hyundai Heavy Industres when their bid proposal was accepted by the Philippine Navy's Technical Working Group for the Frigate Acquisition Program. Why would Hyundai deviate its offer from the proven TACTICOS to the less proven Hanwha Naval Shield?

Secondly, to make it simple, does the Hanwha Naval Shield meet the Technical Specifications set by the Philippine Navy for all subsystems of the frigates. If it doesn't meet the specs, then why bother using them? So far, TACTICOS met the specs of the project, and the Navy's own hired consultant for the project agrees to it too.

Thirdly, does the change from TACTICOS to Naval Shield conform with the Government Procurement laws under RA 9184? If it does not, then why push it to happen? Breaching the law is considered an illegal act and may be a valid reason to stop a deal and compromise the success of the project.

Also, in its recommendation letter to relieve VAdm. Mercado, it was indicated that the Philippine Navy's TWG rated the Hanwha Naval Shield as compliant to the project's requirement. The question here is, did the PN's FAP TWG really found the Naval Shield compliant, and did they agree to use it in the first place? Then why are the position papers of the PN TWG and Project Management Team (PMT) since early 2017 up until now all mention that the Hanwha's Naval Shield did not comply to the project's specifications. All position papers of the PN mentioned the same all this time.


With the insistence to correct the use of a non-compliant CMS, for people who do not understand the situation it may appear the VAdm. Mercado and his team are "delaying" the project considering that the Defense Department already issued a memorandum last October 2017 to use the Korean-made Hanwha Systems Naval Shield BL2 as the future frigate's CMS. But for those who understand the situation, is he really delaying the project, or was he just insisting that the project must follow proper process as prescrbed by RA 9184?


In a nutshell, these are at the simplest explanation for the FOIC's position that MaxDefense hopes that even the laymen can understand. MaxDefense will discuss the issues deeper considering that CMS is not the only problem hounding the Frigate Acquisition Project. As of my last count, there are also STRUCTURAL, COMMUNICATIONS, SENSORY, AND SAFETY ISSUES that are not yet discussed but are worth discussing too.

Until then, stay tuned.

Edit: with the Defense Sec. Delfin Lorenzana already releasing a statement on why he ordered the relief of VAdm. Lorenzana, MaxDefense believes its also time to answer and show evidence of what really happened these past few weeks. He even admitted that lots in Social Media has painted the DND into a bad light, and there is a reason why.

Until then, stay tuned.

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Philippine Navy Chief Suddenly Relieved, Frigate Mess Cover Up Highly Likely Reason

In a very suspicious move made by the Philippine Navy and Department of National Defense, the Philippine Navy's Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), Vice Admiral Ronald Joseph Mercado, was relieved from his post and was replaced by AFP J9, Rear Admiral Robert Empedrad effective today, 19th December 2017 at 0900H. This despite VAdm. Mercado was slated for retirement by March 2018 when he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 56 years old. Its still being confirmed what would be VAdm. Mercado's new position.

The turn over appears to have not been covered by the media, or if it did it was done minimally. No speeches whatsoever. And it was done in the Office of the Chief of Staff AFP's instead of a public area. The ceremony was simple: just a quick handover ceremony that isn't normal when replacing the head of a major armed service branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. VAdm. Mercado will prbably be assigned in AFP Headquarters until he retires, which is tantamount to floating status.

Were the issues on the Philippine Navy's Frigate Acquisition Project the reason why FOIC was suddenly replaced? MaxDefense will discuss soon.

As many of our readers may have already known, this is likely something to do with the mess involving the Philippine Navy's Frigate Acquisition Program, which we have been covering since September 2016 before the DND and Hyundai Heavy Industries signed the contract for the deal.

MaxDefense has been raising the alarm on the issue for several months now, wherein Hyundai is attempting to revise the frigate's subsystems and design in violation of RA 9184 and not in compliance to the Technical Specifications of the project, with the backing of the Department of National Defense. This issue has become too serious to the point that the Defense Secretary himself has took notice of our posts and placed MaxDefense in the DND and AFP's monitoring.

Prior to this relief of the FOIC, the chairman of the PN Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee (TIAC) and Project Management Team (PMT) of the Frigate Acquisition Project, Commo. Sean Villa was also relieved from his post last week.

As a background, RAdm. Empedrad was formerly the FAP Technical Working Group head when he was still a Commodore, and was also a FAP Steering Committee member and adviser at the same time as being the AFP's J9. Incidentally, VAdm. Mercado was also the first Technical Working Group head of the FAP before then Commo. Empedrad took over when Mercado became FOIC in 2016.

So why relieve these two important officers of their post, considering their involvement in the project? Why was RAdm Empedrad involved in the Frigate Project until before he was made FOIC despite already the AFP J9 which has nothing to do with the FAP? Why was there even a Steering Committee made by the Defense Secretary despite the presence of a Project Management Team and Technical and Inspection Acceptance Committee? There are many questions actually but we will all bring it to place very soon.

Also why do this change of command just before the Christmas holiday when everyone including the Senate and Congress will be out of session, and the media's attention is on the holidays and the aftermath of the devastating typhoon?

MaxDefense will discuss more of the issues in our next blog entry very soon.

Meanwhile I, Max Montero, is still banned from posting on our Facebook Group Page, as well as on my personal page until next week. Coincidence as well?

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Philippine Navy Plans to Acquire New Corvettes under Horizon 2 Modernization Phase

As the Horizon 1 phase of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Modernization Program setting in the next 2 months, the entire AFP including all its service branches are now preparing for their program line-up for acquisition under the Horizon 2 phase, which covers the years 2018 to 2022.

The Philippine Navy (PN) is determined to move ahead with its own Horizon 2 procurement plans, despite the setback it is facing due to the difficulties in finalizing the critical design of two brand new frigates it will acquire from Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) of South Korea due to issues that deserve its own discussion. 

Moving ahead (for now), MaxDefense has been continuously monitoring the proposals submitted by the different service branches these past several months, which is now broken down to yearly requests based on a program for the entire Horizon. Several projects look promising depending on the National Government's willingness to provide the funding.

One of these projects coming from the Philippine Navy that is being requested for funding under CY 2018 is for the acquisition of a Corvette.

NOTE: This project is still in the proposal stage, and would require approval from the National Government for the budget to be allocated, although the chances that this would become a reality is pretty high, even after some budget reduction, based on MaxDefense's own assessment.

TKMS has released new iterations of the MEKO A100 Corvette design, shown with either the "Energy Saving Hull Design" or the conventional hull design.
Photo taken from NavyRecognition.com.

Corvette Acquisition Project:

Currently this proposed project has no name yet, which MaxDefense conveniently named as the "Proposed Corvette Acquisition Project" for discussion purposes, which is based on how the DND and PN named the Frigate project before.

While there are not much details about the project, the budget proposed for this acquisition may say a lot of things due to the experiences the PN and groups like ours in the FAP.

For CY 2018, the request is for funding for 1 Corvette with an initial proposed ABC of Php 9,000,000,000.00 as of August 2017, but increased to Php14,000,000,000.00 by September 2017 Is the figure familiar?

It should be, because at Php 9 billion a piece, it is exactly the same amount allocated by the DND and PN for each of the FAP frigates to be built by HHI! For those who are not familiar, the FAP was divided into 2 parts: Lot 1 with a budget of Php16 billion is for the acquisition of 2 frigate platforms, while Lot 2 with a budget of Php2 billion is for the acquisiton of ammunition (missiles, torpedoes, gun ammunition, and countermeasure rounds).

But now at Php14 billion each ($274 million at US$1 = Php51), it is now costlier than the FAP frigates!

Based on this information alone, MaxDefense can gauge what we could expect of the corvette, just by basing it on the history of the FAP project.

GRSE is said to be among those expected to provide an offer, possibly with an improved version of the original offer it made during the FAP's procurement stages. GRSE previously mentioned that it was offering a design based on the Indian Navy's Kamorta-class large anti-submarine corvettes, which are large ships compared to those offered by European shipbuilders.
Credits to owner of photo.

Possible Contenders:

While budget is still being proposed and still for requesting, the PN already started getting Request for Information, Proposals, and Quotations (RFI, RFP, RFQ respectively) from different shipbuilders, but probably this would not include HHI, which according to our sources, the PN doesn't want to deal with for now.

Among those MaxDefense expects to provide their proposals to the PN are those who competed for the FAP and lost. This may include Garden Reach Shipbuilding and Engineering (GRSE) of India, who is confident to provide a frigate/corvette warship at a price lower than the proposed ABC. Other shipbuilders may include former FAP contenders ThyssenKrupp Marine Shipbuilding (TKMS) of Germany and Navantia of Spain, as well as newcomers like Damen of the Netherlands and The Naval Group (formerly DCNS) of France. Other Korean shipbuilders may also give interest including Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) and STX.

  

MaxDefense expects Dutch shipbuilder Damen to join the game and offer their SIGMA series of corvette design.
Photo taken from Damen's website.

Comparing to the Frigate Acquisition Project:

Depending on how we interpret the budget being requested for the Corvette, MaxDefense believes that the PN would specify their Corvette at a higher league than the FAP Frigates, and may have a higher level of sensor and firepower requirement as originally envisioned for the FAP. Even if the platform is smaller than the frigates to be built by HHI, the PN may have no issues with them as long as it meets certain requirements.

Take note that during the early stages of the FAP procurement phase, both Navantia and TKMS offered a platform that is smaller than the design proposed by HHI. And although the PN's preference was for a larger platform considering they were in the market for a frigate wherein a larger platform is better to allow future capabilities to be added later on, the PN was open to the proposals of TKMS and Navantia.

TKMS previously disclosed to MaxDefense that their offer was based on their MEKO A100 corvette design, which is less than 100 meters long and displaces around 2,400 tons at full load. Meanwhile, Navantia's proposal for FAP was made known in a public post they made a few years ago, with a platform based on their Avante 2200 Combatant corvette. It has similarities in dimension to TKMS' offer, with less than 100 meters long and displaces at around 2,500 tons at full load. In comparison, HHI's offer which is based on their HDF-3000 light frigate design, is a little over 105 meters long and may displace at around 3,000 tons at full load.

Budget issue was a problem with the FAP which made shipbuilders cut down their design just to meet the costs, while discouraging other shipbuilders especially European and American ones from joining. But even with a low budget with the FAP, it should be remembered that GRSE, the lowest bidder during the FAP's Lot 1 (Platform) 2nd stage bidding, was able to bid for a light frigate with dimensions larger than that of Hyundai's FAP proposal, and with respectable sensors and weapons suite for around Php7.6 billion each (without ammunition). MaxDefense sources privy to the FAP confirmed that until recently, GRSE confirmed that they can still deliver a FAP contender for less than HHI's contract price, and with a better weapons and sensor suite than what HHI has been pushing the PN and DND to accept.

Recap on GRSE's FAP Proposal as Baseline:

To give a baseline on what Php 9 billion can buy, let's use GRSE's submitted proposal for the FAP as basis.

For those who have not read this before, please feel free to check our previous blog entry discussing the FAP's weapons system proposal from HHI and GRSE:

"The Philippine Navy's Future Frigate from Hyundai: Discussing the Ship's Design and Some of its Expected Subsystems" - dated September 3, 2016

At a little over Php 7.6 billion a ship (without ammunition), GRSE's FAP proposed include a full sensors and communication suite from Thales, 4 tubes of MM40 Exocet anti-ship and two twin Simbad RC-Mistral VSHORAD missile launchers from MBDA, two triple torpedo launchers from SEA, a 76mm Oto Melara Super Rapid primary and a 30mm Oto Melara Hitfist secondary guns, and a platform based on the Kamorta-class large anti-submarine corvette, which is large enough and worthy to be called a light frigate.

Even HHI, despite their attempts to short-change the PN, is still capable of providing a light frigate for Php 7.95 billion (without ammunition) using sensors and weapons system that have lesser performance than those they originally offered, or to those offered by GRSE.

Originally posted in MaxDefense in October 2016 in collaboration with Pitz Defense Analysis (who assisted in the labelling), here is the ORIGINAL proposal submitted by Hyundai Heavy Industries for the PN's frigate. Note that many of the items there are to be replaced with a less performing subsystems. But this provides an insight on what the PN may specify for their Corvette Project.
Original photo from Hyundai, labels from MaxDefense and Pitz Defense Analysis.

It would be remembered that both Navantia and STX attempted to submit a bid for the FAP's 2nd stage bidding, but failing only due to technicalities. But knowing that the ABC for the FAP Lot 1 was only Php 16 billion for 2 ships, it means that they are willing to meet the budget for their proposals.

MaxDefense believes that the PN may have also realized that Php2 billion allocated for ammunition of 2 light frigates may not be enough.

But with a Php14 billion budget, this becomes a game changer as shipbuilders won't need to hold back as much like what happened in the FAP, while also opening the chance fornother shipbuilders to join.

MaxDefense believes that with the budget, a ship similar in size as the HHI proposal for FAP can be attained, while giving enough budget to not downgrade the sensors system like what happened on the FAP. It also allows the installation of items considered as "Fitted for but now with" (FFBNW) items in the FAP like Towed Array Sonar System (TASS), Vertical Launch System (VLS), and Close-in Weapon System (CIWS).

MaxDefense also believes that ammunition will be included in the Php14 billion budget.

Another possibility on the use of the extra budget is for the shipbuilder to also provide a Technology Transfer and allow the ship to be built in the Philippines. The tech transfer is not free so a portion of the budget might be allocated for such arrangement.

This could allow the PN to build the 1st corvette, and any succeeding unit locally, benefitting the Philippine shipbuilding industry and allowing it to prepare for future warship requirements like the proposed Frigates under Horizon 2 phase.

Slap on Hyundai's Face:

MaxDefense believes that this Corvette Acquisition Project is now being used by the Philippine Navy as a "Plan B" for their Frigates, should they not be able to get them according to what they wanted it to be.

It would be remembered that originally, the PN was raising the possibility to have a 3rd frigate that could be awarded to Hyundai to probably sweeten the deal. But HHI's post-contract actions could have made the PN decide to cancel that option, and instead create a new project that could turn out better than the FAP.

Also, while there is only 1 Corvette being requested for CY 2018, MaxDefense was able to get hold of the latest Horizon 2 plan of the Philippine Navy. And it appears that they are planning to have 2 Corvettes for acquisition within the Horizon 2 phase, and this 1st unit was probably pushed forward to catch-up with the FAP's delivery schedule. The PN may opt to have a contract for 1 ship with options for 1 more.

And aside from the Corvette, the PN is planning to have another 2 frigates for funding within Horizon 2, and learning from their mistakes on the FAP, the proposed budget for each frigate is now Php 18 billion, or double that of the FAP. Look at what you will miss, HHI, is these projects are approved for funding!

The only worry many officers in the PN have is if certain personalities in the Department of National Defense (DND), specifically those who protected HHI instead of defending what is best for the PN, may once again use their power and influence to dictate to the PN what they should acquire. And this is the reason why MaxDefense believes that, learning from the past, the PN may now instead pre-select subsystems to be used instead of relying on shipbuilders to propose the subsystems themselves.

Its either the PN would procure the subsystems itself, or they will specify to the shipbuilders the exact subsystems that they wanted their ships to have. This gives the shipbuilders clearer parameters, and all they need to do is create a platform based on those subsystems. It also levels the playing field while also keeping certain people in the DND to be hands off the project. 

The lessons it learned from the Frigate Acquisition Project (FAP) may allow the PN to make their future acquisitions more responsive to their needs, hopefully without the meddling and interference by some groups within the DND who placed their personal interests first before assisting the PN get the best equipment the government can buy.

How about the Procurement of Multi Purpose Patrol Vessel?

With the Corvette being prepped by the PN for acquisition, what happens then to the Multi-Purpose Patrol Vessel (MPPV), which MaxDefense previously reported as among those being eyed from procurement soon.

According to sources, the PN is temporarily shelving this program, and may opt to raise it again for CY 2019 or 2020, as they are trying to give importance to heavier firepower by upgrading existing assets first. 

As mentioned in our FB page a few days ago, the PN is also trying to secure funding for the weapon system upgrade of all 3 Del Pilar-class frigates with a proposed budget of Php 15 billion, and the upgrade of the Pohang-class corvette that is expected to join the fleet early next year with a proposed budget of Php 6.2 billion.

Let's see what happens if the PN will be successful in securing budget for these multi-billion peso projects, considering that the current administration prefers internal security matters. It would be best for the PN to defend their requests by relating these projects into internal security operations, just for the sake of getting the funds they need.

The PN is shelving the MPPV project for now, while focusing on the Corvette, and other PN projects that are more relevant to the times. Money will also be needed to upgrade the upcoming Pohang-class corvette which is expect to enter service by early 2018.
Credits to owner of photo.

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