According to very credible sources involved in the project, the
Philippine Navy recently released a Request for Information (RFI) for 6 Fast
Attack Crafts to equip the Littoral Combat Force,
Philippine Fleet. This is to fulfill a partial requirement under the
Philippine Navy’s Capability Upgrade Program's Horizon 2 phase.
Despite
bring a Horizon 2 project, it is now being front-loaded for early processing
rather than wait until 2018 due to the prerogatives of new Philippine president, Rodrigo Roa Duterte, in beefing up the capabilities to fight
internal threats like insurgency, terrorism, and drug shipments as part of his
overall security plan.
Background:
In
simplistic terms, the Philippine Navy describe Fast Attack Crafts as small,
heavily armed boats, with sufficient sensor capability to detect targets from a
distance, and can run at high speeds sufficient enough to catch up and
intercept other fast craft threats.
Among the
missions it is expected to do is to intercept terrorists and kidnappers moving
along the porous borders of the Philippines with Malaysia and Indonesia, and
terrorists moving along the scattered islands within the country to escape
military assaults or conduct localized kidnappings, intercept smugglers especially
those carrying weapons for terrorist or insurgent groups and illegal substances
like drugs.
The fast
attack crafts are also designed to conduct standard naval operations in support
of territorial defense, including naval patrols, and surface combat against opposing
naval surface threats if necessary.
Based on
previous Capability Upgrade Program acquisition plans of the Philippine Navy,
the requirement for fast attack crafts stemmed out from the need for Patrol
Gunboats, which later on were adjusted to a fleet of Multi-Purpose Attack
Crafts (MPAC) armed with missiles and guns.
Shortcomings
of the MPAC?:
MaxDefense
was expecting early on, that when the Philippine Navy decided to use the MPAC as
a littoral interdictor and patrol boat, it would encounter problems because the MPAC was not purpose built to be a coastal interdictor and patrol craft. The MPAC was designed
as a fast insertion boat for special operation forces or marine troops, lightly
armed for self defense and fire support of landing or retreating troops, and
fast and small enough to compensate for
stealth.
MaxDefense
found out that the Philippine Navy encountered some issues regarding the use of
MPAC design for interdiction and patrol duties when problems came out on the latest
MPAC acquisition project for the Mark 3 version. This variant is larger, heavier, and
better armed than the previous MPACs (locally called the Mark 1 and Mark 2
variants).
It was probably
found out that the current MPAC design is too small to accommodate enough space
to mount heavier weapons, and to provide enough power to the automated and
electronic weapons systems that are used to mount the guns and missiles. It is
also possible that the current design is maxed-out to meet the standard
requirements of the boat to reach the desired speed, endurance, and capability
to meet the required operations at Sea State 5 without degradation of subsystem
operations.
Lack of
space also means that the MPAC will have less space for crew quarters and
supplies, ammunition storage, fuel, and movement space. It also means that the
boat is heavier and possibly will have a reduced speed compared to its lightly
armed sister-ships, thus will need a more powerful engine that is also
physically larger.
MaxDefense
also received information that the Philippine Navy plans to use the armed MPACs
to slip inside the well deck of the Tarlac-class landing platform
dock or any future LPD and any other amphibious assault ships of the fleet. This means the
MPAC must retain its size, reduce its mast height (or adjust accordingly), and
maintain a certain weight limit for safe carriage on the well deck’s platform
during transit.
These
issues are probably considered by the Philippine Navy, resulting to the
formulation of a need for larger, purpose built fast attack crafts for
interdiction and coastal patrol duties, with a larger size and enough space,
speed, and endurance than the MPAC.
The Current
PROPOSAL:
So far, the
Philippine Navy appears to have only made a Request for Information to Israel Shipyards, based in Haifa, Israel.
Israel
Shipyards, with the assistance of the Israel Ministry of Defense, proposed
their SHALDAG MK. V fast patrol boat to the Philippine Navy. The Mk. V, which
is currently the Shaldag family’s largest variant, is almost the same size as
the Philippine Navy’s own Andrada-class patrol gunboats, but is faster and is
proven to carry more weapons than the PN’s almost 30-year old US-designed boats.
More on the
boat’s dimensions and technical information can be found on the link provided
HERE:
The
proposed Philippine Navy variant of the Shaldag Mk. V is expected to be armed
with a stabilized remote weapons station for a 25mm gun, and small
surface-to-surface missiles which MaxDefense expects to be the Spike family due
to the PN’s recent order of Spike-ER missiles for the MPAC Mk. 3. Other future
small anti-ship missiles could also be considered in the future. Manually-operated
machine guns are also expected.
It is also
expected to be fitted with a navigation & surface search radar, and an
electro-optical fire control system, probably similar to those already in use
in existing Philippine Navy ships. Space for a rigid-hull inflatable boat
(RHIB) is also available, and is expected considering the PN’s existing patrol
boat fit.
Included in
the offer from Israel Shipyard are an Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) for
the boats for a specific number of years, and a Transfer of Technology (ToT) clause
which allows the Philippine Navy’s own Naval Yard to construct their own fast
attack crafts based on Israel Shipyard’s own technology, including additional
units the Shaldag Mk. V. MaxDefense believes that it is possible that some of
the boats included in the 6 units could be built by the Philippine Navy in their Naval Yard in Cavite.
Considering the price difference between the MPAC and the Shaldag Mk. V, MaxDefense expects that other avenues will be
considered by the Philippine Navy, including mixing both types into a "high-low", or a "high-mid-low" mix, with MPACs expected to bear the higher
percentage of the expected 30-boat acquisition as the “low” tier of the
force mixture, while the Shaldags could be considered the “high” level.
The Transfer of Technology clause on the proposal also means that the Philippine Navy is expected to build more of the type in the future, and this does not make sense if the PN does not make maximize the use of this deal inclusion.
Future Proposals Expected:
Aside from
Israel Shipyards, MaxDefense believes that another Israeli shipbuilder, IAI-Ramta,
would probably make a move to submit their own proposals with their Super Dvora series of fast
patrol boats to the Philippine Navy. Although MaxDefense sources confirmed
that the Shaldag is currently the favourite of the officers within the Littoral Combat Force to
meet their requirements. The Super Dvora is considered smaller than the Shaldag Mk. V and could slot in somewhere between the middle of the two types, although Israel Shipyards also have smaller Shaldag designs, like their Mk. III and Mk. IV series, that could be counter offered should IAI-Ramta do offer their products.
It is also
expected that countries with existing Defense Cooperation Agreement with the
Philippines will submit their formal offers to the Philippine Navy as well,
like those from the US, Korea, Indonesia, Australia, and others, although there is no indication yet that such
was already made except for the one submitted by Israel Shipyards as of this posting.
It is possible that other offers would be made by other shipyards, like the Mk. VI patrol boat used by the US Navy and made by SAFE Boats International. But that remains to be seen. |
IMPORTANT NOTE TO MAXDEFENSE READERS:
MaxDefense reminds its readers that this is just an offer made by a single shipyard based on an RFI, and does not correspond to any purchase.
MaxDefense will provide more information once they become available, especially if the Philippine Navy decides to move closer to an actual acquisition deal rather than just consider an proposal.